Alabama Law Scholarly Commons
Articles

Faculty Scholarship

1996

Rodrigo's Eleventh Chronicle: Empathy and False Empathy
Chronicle
Richard Delgado
University of Alabama - School of Law, rdelgado@law.ua.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ua.edu/fac_articles

Recommended Citation
Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Eleventh Chronicle: Empathy and False Empathy Chronicle, 84 Cal L. Rev. 61
(1996).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ua.edu/fac_articles/369

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Alabama Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Alabama Law Scholarly
Commons.

Rodrigo's Eleventh Chronicle:
Empathy and False Empathy
Richard Delgadot
INTRODUCTION: RODRIGO RETURNs AND AccoUNTs

FOR His RECENT AcTvrms
I was sitting in my darkened office one afternoon, thinking about life.
To tell the truth, I was missing Rodrigo.' Not long ago, I had consigned
him to the Great Beyond.2 But now, I was flooded with regret and sadness.
I missed his brashness, his insouciant originality. Odd, I had not thought of
myself as sentimental. How could I have allowed him to succumb to the
Copyright © 1996 California Law Review, Inc.

t Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado; J.D., Boalt Hall School of
Law, University of California, Berkeley, 1974.
I. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Chronicle, 101 YALE L.J. 1357 (1992) (review essay),
[hereinafter Delgado, Chronicle], introducing Rodrigo Crenshaw, my fictional alter ego and the halfbrother of famed civil rights lawyer Geneva Crenshaw. See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED:
THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RAcIAL JUSTICE (1987) (on Geneva). The son of an African American
serviceman and an Italian mother, Rodrigo moved to Italy when his father was assigned to a U.S.
outpost there. After he graduated from the base high school, Rodrigo attended Bologna University
where he earned a law degree and graduated second in his class. Rodrigo's Chronicle opens when the
young law graduate seeks out "the professor" (his fictional mentor and intellectual foil) for career
advice. Despite their age difference, the two become good friends, discussing in a series of meetings
over the following two years nationalism and Critical Race Theory (Delgado, Chronicle, supra); the
economic free market and race (Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Second Chronicle: The Economics and
Politics of Race 91 MIcH. L. REv. 1183 (1993) (book review) [hereinafter Delgado, Second
Chronicle]); love and civil rights (Rodrigo's Third Chronicle: Care, Competition, and the Redemptive
Tragedy of Race, 81 CALIF. L. REv. 387 (1993) (review dialogue) (hereinafter Delgado, Third
Chronicle]); legal rules and culture (Richard Delgado, Rodrigo 's Fourth Chronicle: Neutrality and
Stasis in AntidiscriminationLaw, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1133 (1993) (review essay) [hereinafter Delgado,
Fourth Chronicle]); the neorepublican revival (Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fifth Chronicle: Civitas,
Civil Wrongs, and the Politics of Denial,45 STAN. L. REv. 1581 (1993)); the relation of black men and
black women (Richard Delgado, Rodrigo 's Sixth Chronicle:Intersections,Essences, and the Dilemma
of Social Reform, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 639 (1993) [hereinafter Delgado, Sixth Chronicle]);the theory of
the state (Richard Delgado, Rodrigo 's Seventh Chronicle:Race, Democracy, and the State, 41 UCLA L.
REv. 721 (1994)); black and white crime (Richard Delgado, Rodrigo'sEighth Chronicle:Black Crime,
White Fears-On the Social Construction of Threat, 80 VA. L. REv. 503 (1994) [hereinafter Delgado,
Eighth Chronicle]);pragmatism and civil rights (Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Ninth Chronicle: Race,
Legal Instrumentalism, and the Rule of Law, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 379 (1994) [hereinafter Delgado, Ninth
Chronicle]);and merit and race (Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Tenth Chronicle: Merit and Affirmative
Action, 83 GEo. L.J. 1711 (1995) [hereinafter Delgado, Tenth Chronicle]).
2. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo 's FinalChronicle: CulturalPower, the Law Reviews, and the
Attack on Narrative Jurisprudence, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 545, 574-75 (1995) (discussing Rodrigo's
disappearance after his struggle to justify narrative legal discourse).
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critique of narrativity in Rodrigo's Final Chronicle?3 I had gotten a great
series of articles out of our meetings. 4 He had pushed and challenged my
thinking, and helped dispel some of the loneliness I've felt in this sometimes desolate job. And now, he was gone.
I was just getting ready to turn on the light and resume reading the pile
of seminar papers that had awaited me since my return from the AALS,
when I heard a shuffling sound outside my door. A brown envelope materialized on my carpet, pushed through the crack by someone whose footsteps
I now heard disappearing down the hall. "I'm here," I shouted.
"Oh, I didn't see your light," a familiar voice said.
I turned on the switch and opened the door. "Rodrigo!" I exclaimed.
"I was just thinking about you. What are you doing here?"
"We last parted rather suddenly," Rodrigo explained, "so I brought
you a note explaining what happened to me after that incident at the AALS.
I didn't want it to be too much of a shock. I also brought you a book-a
magazine, actually."5
"Come on in. What on earth happened to you? I was afraid I would
never see you again."
Rodrigo picked up the envelope from the floor, laid it on the comer of
my desk, and glanced around my office. "Do you have a minute?" He
gestured toward the pile of neatly typed student papers in the center of my
desk. "It looks like you're busy."
"Quite the contrary," I assured him. "These grades aren't due for
another week. I'm eager to hear what happened to you. And, before you
begin, can I offer you some coffee?"
My young friend nodded enthusiastically, and sat down in the one
chair in my office not presently used as a bookshelf or table. As I busied
myself measuring the water and grounds for my new office coffee maker (a
sleek European model), Rodrigo began.
"Do you remember, Professor, where we were when the lights went
out?"
"Yes, we had been talking, rather late at night as I remember, in that
basement dive in the giant AALS hotel. We were discussing the critique of
narrativity and legal storytelling, in particular that section meeting where
3. Id. at 574 (describing how Rodrigo self-deconstructs in the face of the formalist attack on
narrative jurisprudence). "Like all storytelling, had [Rodrigo] and his lessons been lost in a cloud of
abstraction, in which learned commentators paid endless attention to the form, the quality, the procedure
of storytelling, and gradually lost sight of the content of the stories themselves?" Id. Happily, my
concern that Rodrigo's voice had been silenced was greatly exaggerated. See infra notes 5-10 and
accompanying text.
4. See supra notes 1-2 (describing previous Chronicles); see also Ric ARD DELOADO, THe
RODRIGO CHRoNIcLES: CONVERSATIONS ABouT AMERICA AND RACE (1995).
5. The magazine, as I learned later, was RACE TRATOR, edited by Noel Ignatiev and John
Garvey. The package also contained Treason to Whiteness Is Loyalty to Humanity: An Interview with
Noel Ignatiev of Race Traitor Magazine, UTNE READER, Nov.Dec. 1994, at 82 [hereinafter Treason]
(outlining the ideas and actions of a Race Traitor). See infra notes 165-173 and accompanying text.
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several of our colleagues attacked the new forms of scholarship as nonlegal,
unfair, even exclusionary.6 Others questioned the role of student-run law
reviews.7 You had just said something about how we are all creatures of
our own narratives, which immediately filled me with alarm. Then the
lights went out." 8
"I figured it was the kids playing at the video arcade next to our booth,
and that the lights would be back on again in a matter of minutes," Rodrigo
said.9 "I saw you put your head down, assumed you were tired, and got up
to stretch my legs. I thought of leaving you a note. ..."
"When I woke up, you were nowhere to be seen," I interjected. "Regular for you, right?" I asked, reaching for two coffee mugs.
Rodrigo nodded. "Thanks. Cream and sugar, please."
"I was afraid you had deconstructed yourself, allowed yourself to
become a casualty of Farber, Sherry, Tushnet, and the critique of
narrativity.' 0
"Nothing so fancy, Professor, although I think you'll enjoy the story.
In fact, what took place prompted me to come see you. Aside from reassuring you that I haven't expired, I've really wanted to discuss something, if
you've got a minute."
"Of course! I'd love to know what happened and what you're thinking. Here we are."
I handed Rodrigo a steaming mug, he stirred in creamer and his trademark four teaspoons of sugar, and continued. "You won't believe this, Professor, but I was kidnapped."
"Kidnapped? Are you serious?"
"I am. Do you remember those kids who were playing at the video
games along the wall?"
"Sure. They borrowed change from us once. I remember that they
looked at you closely, but thought nothing of it at the time. So what
happened?"
"It turns out they were not kids at all, but members of a British antiroyalist gang. This I only found out later. I had just stood up from the table
when, quick as a flash, there was a cloth bag over my head, my hands and
feet were being tied, and I was carried outside and into a car. The whole
thing took maybe thirty seconds."
"My God!" I exclaimed. "What happened then? And why were they
after you?"
6.

Delgado, supra note 2, at 548-58.

7. Id. at 556-57 (discussing critique of law reviews and legal scholarship).
8. Id. at 574.

9. Id at 563 (describing entertainment activities of young teenagers).
10. Id. at 548-51 (summarizing critique of storytelling scholarship by these and other scholars);
see also Jane B. Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 255 (1994) (responding to the

critique).
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"This requires some memory on your part, Professor. Do you recall
how I got back to the U.S. that first time?"' I1
"I do," I said. "It was a neat little two-step maneuver. After you were
deported back to Italy, you resettled in Ireland, using your law degree and
taking advantage of the liberalized guest-worker provisions in the European
Community. You got a job as a paralegal in Dublin, hung around coffeehouses for awhile, then returned to the United States by means of a private
12
bill."
"With a little help from the Irish Immigration Society and a certain
3
famous U.S. Senator of Irish descent who sponsors these bills routinely.'
I'm sure you remember what I did before returning, Professor."
I hesitated a moment, and Rodrigo continued. "I think I mentioned
this to you before. I bought a title of nobility from a down-at-the-heels
member of the British aristocracy. 4 I really wanted to get back and start
my LL.M. studies, and didn't want to take any chances. It turned out my
investment was probably unnecessary-my American forebears and Italian
law degree were probably enough-but that small act led to my adventure."
"You mean your kidnappers thought you really were the third duke of
Crenshaw?" I asked, beginning to catch on.
"They did. It turned out the group was a collection of exiles just chafing for something to do. And when they heard from headquarters that
someone on their list was apparently right here in the U.S., they decided to
pick me up and give me a going-over."
"But of course their grievance was not with you, but with the real duke
of Crenshaw, the one who sold you the title."
"Apparently he was a Royalist and something of a bad actor, from the
liberationists' perspective, at least. The whole thing didn't become clear
until they got me to their hideaway."
"Did you have to do some fast talking?"
"The team that commandeered me did. You should have seen their
faces when they took the bag off my head and saw a black man instead of a
light-skinned English aristocrat! Their leader was furious. They tried to
explain that the restaurant had been dimly lit. They got out the photos. I
actually do look slightly like the duke, except for our skin color. I met him
briefly when I paid for the title; we're about the same height, weight, and
age. So, their mistake was understandable."
"What happened when they got through blaming each other?"
"That's when I had to talk fast. One of them wanted to give me a hard
time for having bought the title of nobility in the first place. 'A little

11. Rodrigo had been deported from the United States and airmailed a letter to the professor
describing the deportation. Delgado, Chronicle,supra note 1, at 1379.
12.
13.
14.

Delgado, Second Chronicle,supra note 1, at 1183-86.
Id. at 1186.
Id.
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would-be Englisher' he called me. I could see trouble coming, so I
explained to them how I was a leftist and a race reformer.1 5 I told them I
only became a duke because I wanted to get back to the States. I explained
that not only is this my homeland, but that I had a mission here. They
looked dubious at first, then finally gave in when I applied Critical Race
Theory to their own anti-royalist movement. We ended up going to a local
brewpub and debating philosophy and soccer. After a while, they swore me
to secrecy for seventy-two hours and drove me back to the hotel. When I
got in I tried to look you up, but you had already checked out and headed
back to the airport."
"Quite a story," I said. "Reminds me of Morris Zapp's adventure in
Small World."16
"The parallel did strike me," Rodrigo acknowledged. "Although at the
time I wasn't sure it would turn out so well."
"Well, I'm very happy you're back and in one piece."
While Rodrigo took a swig of his coffee, I took the opportunity to
remind him: "But you said you had something you wanted to talk to me
about. Did it have to do with your kidnapping?"
Rodrigo leaned forward on my ancient office chair. "It did, in a way.
And also with that magazine I brought you. The whole experience got me
to thinking of the role empathy plays in our society. The activists who
snatched me, even though they were at first taken aback, came around when
they learned I was a fellow reformer. At first, I was afraid they'd just throw
me off a bridge somewhere. But we ended up comparing notes and having
a good time. It turned out we had a surprising amount in common."
"They empathized with your struggle, and you with theirs, in other
words." I was silent for a moment. "So, the critique of narrativity caused
you to disappear, but empathy brought you back. Awfully tidy, and, I must
say, a little upbeat for a young Crit like you," I said, pushing Rodrigo. "Or
am I reading you correctly?"
"You and I did talk about the role of empathy once before, Professor.
We agreed it is getting in shorter and shorter supply, particularly with
respect to minorities of color.17 Yet I was able to connect quickly with my
15. See, e.g., Delgado, Chronicle, supra note 1, at 1361-65 (discussing "criteria regression" as
designed to exclude minorities from the legal profession and how traditional merit criteria operate as

affirmative action for whites); Delgado, Second Chronice supra note 1 at 1193 (explaining that the free
market will not eliminate racism in American culture but will instead foster narrative explanations to

maintain the racist construct); Delgado, Third Chronicle,supra note 1 (arguing for a "new civil rights
myth" founded on love and justice to expand society's sympathies to now-excluded groups); Delgado,
Eighth Chronicle, supra note 1 (describing the social construction of black crime, and pointing out the
root causes and overwhelming social costs of white crime).
16. DAVID Lonos, SMALL WoRLD: AN AcADENuc RoMArca (1984), tells the story of an

ambitious academic who is abducted from the Villa Serbelloni in Bellagio, Italy.
17.

Delgado, Second Chronicle supra note 1, at 1187-1201 (describing how Western society is

turning an increasingly deaf ear to minorities); Delgado, Third Chronicle,supra note 1, at 403-08, 411-
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captors, once they got over their shock at finding a black man under the bag
when they expected a blueblood English aristocrat."
"Maybe there's some level on which marginalized people of all sorts
can understand each other," 8 I suggested. "And so, do you think this is
something our people can tap into in these troubled times, when society
seems to be devoting less and less attention to our needs, the Republican
right is in full cry, affirmative action is under attack, and welfare programs
are being cut left and right?"
"No," Rodrigo said, shifting uncomfortably. "I believe the opposite is
the case. I'd like to start with a thought experiment that occurred to me as I
was being driven back to the hotel."
"I'd love to hear it."
Rodrigo drained his coffee mug, set it carefully on my desk, and
began.
I
RODRIGO'S INQUISPRO EXAMPLE AND THE UNRELIABILITY OF EMPATHY
AS A SOURCE OF SUCCOR FOR Ou-rSIDER GROUPS

"Professor, imagine that some scientific genius develops a computer
called Inquispro, which discovers and evaluates the facts behind any litigation and issues an objective ruling. Inquispro can scan any segment of
space and time and tell us what happened."
"So, we wouldn't have to rely on witnesses with fading memories, or
speculative and inferential evidence," I said.
"Not only that," Rodrigo continued, "but Inquispro knows all the substantive law. We would program it so that it knows the elements of every
cause of action or crime."
"So, for example, Smith might accuse Jones of negligence in failing to
clear his sidewalks of snow. With Inquispro, we could simply ask the computer to apply the elements of a negligence cause of action to what happened when Smith slipped in front of Jones' house the day of the accident."
"Exactly," Rodrigo replied. "And so with all the other causes of action
in the law books. Inquispro could methodically go through all the cases
filed, apply the facts to the relevant law and solve them each in a fraction of
a second."
"This would obviously be a great boon to our overworked judiciary," I
said. "Indeed, it could eliminate our need for judges and jurors. And there
wouldn't be much need for lawyers or law professors, either, although I
14 (same); see also Cathy Scarborough, ConceptualizingBlack Women's Employment Experiences, 98
YALE

L.. 1457, 1467-78 (1989) (discussing ways the law makes black women invisible).

18.

See Mar J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls:Multiple Consciousnessas Jurisprudential

Method, 11 WoMEN's Rrs. L. REP. 7 (1989) (suggesting that an underlying bond unites all oppressed
peoples). Indeed, empathy requires recognition and understanding of others to begin transforming the
empathizer. See infra notes 19-65 and accompanying text.
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suppose someone would have to program the computer with the relevant
substantive law."
"Do you remember our recent conversation, Professor, in which we
talked about white and black crime? 19 We discussed the role of discretion
and leniency in prosecuting the sorts of crimes that are committed by corporate executives, suburban youth, and governmental figures."20
"Of course," I said. "Everyone knows what happens: the inner city
black youth guilty of stealing hubcaps or selling a small amount of drugs is
sent away for a long period, while the well-regarded white figure receives
probation or a light sentence, even though the latter's crimes may be more
serious, in both a monetary and a physical-safety sense. 21 And so this is the
type of thing your computer could not take into account; differential treatment based upon the race or class of the criminal?"
"That's right," Rodrigo replied. "And so, after a while, society would
rebel. We would insist on programming sentencing discretion and pleabargaining laxity into the computer. Otherwise automobile executives
would receive long sentences when one of their poorly designed cars killed
someone. Savings and loan executives would receive fifty-year
sentences.2 2 And so on."
Seeking to play the devil's advocate, I interjected. "But doesn't a sentencing system in which the jury decides on the appropriate punishment,
either in the sentence itself or through the choice of offense, provide exactly
the discretionary empathy whose absence you deplore? Don't we need a
jury, influenced by witnesses, lawyers, and the courtroom itself, to reflect
our community's sense of reasonable conduct, morality, and approbation?"
"That's right," Rodrigo explained calmly, leaning back in what must
be by now a very uncomfortable chair. "But empathy is apt to be quite
selective. Society's rejection of Inquispro shows that we expect a judicial
system that recognizes the individuality of white defendants, but not black
ones. Take the federal sentencing guidelines for drug offenses. Judges in
these cases, in which the defendants are overwhelmingly poor and of color,
are statutorily prevented from considering leniency in sentencing.23 No
such requirements exist, to my knowledge, for securities fraud, tax evasion,
or environmental pollution."
The impact of what Rodrigo was saying sank in on me. "So, Rodrigo,
you are saying that society would never tolerate Inquispro. A genuinely fair
19. Delgado, Eighth Chronicle, supra note 1.
20. Id. at 525-32.
21. Id. at 522-32, app. B at 547-48 (arguing that white-collar and corporate crime are more
physically dangerous and costly in an aggregate and a per capita sense than street crime). Nevertheless,
lenient or non-penal sentences are often imposed because of a perception that white-collar criminals are
more sensitive or redeemable. Id. at 525-26 & n.71.
22. See id. at 525-26.
23. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,FEDERALa
SENTENCINo GumELNsS MANUAL §§ 2DI.1-2D3.2
(1994) (prescribing minimum sentences for offenses involving drugs).
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judiciary that provided equal justice for whites and blacks would be intolerable. We would insist on reprogramming Inquispro so that it was, basically,
racist. So that it had a bias in favor of clean, neat, well-educated white
defendants and against black ones, in favor of upper-class people of all
colors and against poor ones."24
"We would. Otherwise, society wouldn't accept it."
"And the moral you draw from this fiendish experiment, Rodrigo, is
"Our society doesn't really want empathy for outgroups or minorities,
any more than it wants equal treatment for all people.2 5 Quite the contrary,
we prefer preferential treatment for ourselves and our kind. We would
never accept anything less than that, in fact."
"Which is what your Inquispro example shows," I replied glumly. I
took the chance to offer Rodrigo another mug of coffee (had he ever
declined, I wondered?).
Rodrigo glanced at my shiny black coffee machine, nodded enthusiastically and held out his cup. As he was stirring in his condiments, I asked,
"And I gather you think this lack of empathy is somehow responsible for
our current predicament?"
"I do. I've been thinking about it a great deal," Rodrigo explained,
cupping both hands around the now-hot mug. "Although I hope you won't
jump on me for the rough form of my ideas, Professor. I've developed not
so much a theory as a way of seeing why things aren't better for our people.
I'll be glad to tell you about it, if you have the time."

24. See Delgado, Eighth Chronicle, supra note 1 at 519-20 & nn.57-58, 69 (citing statistics
demonstrating that most white-collar and corporate crimes are committed by whites).
25. On the decrease in empathy generally, or the need for the law and legal discourse to be more
empathic, see, e.g., EizABEmH V. SPE.rMAN,

INESSENTIAL WoMAN: PROnLEMS OF EXCLUSION iN

Ftmnsr THouGrr 11-15, 177-87 (1988) (arguing that white feminists must recognize the differences
of class and race among women); Anne C. Dailey, Feminism's Return to Liberalism, 102 YALE L.J.
1265, 1278-85 (1993) (book review); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in
American Law and Culture: Can FreeExpression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REv.
1258 (1992); Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MicH. L. Ray. 1574 (1987) (arguing that
legal decision making does not embrace an understanding of human experiences); see also Natalie
Angier, Society's Glue: Science Examines Empathy's Role forMan, Beast, DENvER Posr, May 9, 1995,
at 2A, 4A (quoting a leading scientist who points out one drawback of empathy: that identification with
one's in-group tends to be accompanied by dislike of other groups); Scarborough, supra note 17
(arguing that courts must view black women within the context of their past and present experiences).

For the view that empathy is no replacement for legality, see Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal
Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?, 87 MicH. L. Ray. 2099 (1989). For a

critique of empathy that to some extent parallels Massaro's but focuses on empathy's role in liberal and
communitarian political theory, see Cynthia V. Ward, A Kinder, Gentler Liberalism? Visions of
Empathy in Feminist and CommunitarianLiterature, 61 U. CmI. L. REv. 929 (1994).

For various definitions of empathy, see id. at 933-34 (offering psychological, scholarly, and
common-sense definitions of empathy). Rodrigo and the professor use the term in its ordinary-language
sense-the capacity to project or imagine the thoughts and feelings of another person.
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I don't want to make you late for dinner. Is Giannina
"I do, although
26
you?"
expecting
"She's attending a writer's workshop uptown. My schedule's my own
tonight, although I may want to borrow your phone later, if it's okay, and
give her a call. We usually talk to each other around dinner time when one
of us is away doing something."
"Of course," I replied, pointing at the phone. "Anytime you want. I'll
punch in the code, and give you privacy."
"Thanks, Professor. Maybe a little later. And no, I won't be needing
privacy. Giannina considers you almost one of the family."
"I'm honored. But tell me more about your theory of empathy. And
incidentally, if you get hungry, let me know. I have snack food in the
refrigerator.. ." I indicated my small office fridge, which I had recently
purchased and of which I was proud. "Or we could go out for a bite."
"Thanks a lot," Rodrigo said, smiling. "Maybe a little later. Back to
our subject. I start with two observations. One is that empathy is highly
limited. Not only is it in short supply, but it also tends to become rarer over
time.27 And the second is that we think we-and others-have much more
empathy for the downtrodden than we, in fact, do.28 I even have a name for
this. You've heard of Gramsci's concept of false consciousness?" 29
"Of course," I said, a little sharply. (These impudent young pups
sometimes think us old-timers haven't read anything!) "Gramsci coined the
term to mean the kind of identification with the aggressor that a subjugated
people can easily develop. They internalize the perspectives, values, and
points of view of the very people who conquer and oppress them, thus
becoming unconscious agents in their own subordination."3 °
"And so false consciousness is a danger for blacks, at least if we aren't
careful. 3 1 But have you ever wondered, Professor, if there is anything comparable for whites?"
26. On "Giannina," Rodrigo's companion and soul mate, see Delgado, Third Chronicle, supra
note 1, at 402 (introducing Giannina); Delgado, Fourth Chronicle, supra note 1, at 1137 (describing
Giannina's production of a "counter-parody" satirizing law schools' reliance on wealthy donors);
Delgado, Sixth Chronicle, supra note 1, at 639-42, 672 (describing Giannina's role in a debate on
essentialism and feminist legal theory). Giannina, a published poet and playwright, and Rodrigo have
been together for nearly two years.
27. See infra notes 61-65, 75-84, and accompanying text (explaining why this is so).
28. See infra notes 32-39, 54-56, 63-65, 70-74 and accompanying text (explaining this
phenomenon).
29. See GEoRG LuKAcs, HISTORY AND CLASS CoNscIousNEss 72 (Rodney Livingstone trans.,
MIT Press 1971); Duncan Kennedy, Antonio Gramsci and the Legal System, 6 ALSA F. 32, 36-37

(1982).
30. See LunAcs, supra note 29, at 72; Kennedy, supra note 29, at 36-37.
31. Blacks and other people of color could identify with and take on the consciousness of the more
powerful whites, for example by internalizing blame or self-doubt, or by distancing themselves from
affirmative action as certian famous black and brown neoconservatives have done in recent years. E.g.
ACriON BABY (1991); Rrca AR RODRIGUEZ,
SnraHN L. CARTER, REFECTIONs oF AN AmruRMA=r
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"Comparable to false consciousness, you mean?" I wasn't sure what
Rodrigo was driving at.
"I think there is, and it's empathy. Or rather, what I call false empathy, in which a white believes he or she is identifying with a person of
color, but in fact is doing so only in a slight, superficial way."
"It is a kind of parallel," I said. "But I think I could use an example or
two."
"Sure," Rodrigo replied. "Consider the early Settlement House movement. 32 The upper-class ladies who worked there professed to be highly
concerned over the plight of the immigrants who lived in the houses. But
their sympathies did not extend to learning their languages or ways.
Instead, they taught them personal hygiene, housekeeping, English-how
to be American.33 Lawyers make this mistake, too, even public interest
ones. Maybe especially public interest ones."
"I assume you are referring to Derrick Bell's famous article," I asked.
"The one about serving two masters?"3' 4
"That one and others. Bell points out that lawyers working on behalf
of black groups would often pursue one strategy, favored by the litigation
team-say, desegregated schools-when what the client really wanted was
better schools, ones with more resources.3 5 And sometimes even the best
clinicians make similar mistakes. 3 6
Rodrigo continued. "My friend Kowalski and I were talking about this
the other day.37 Even in those client-centered aspects of law like clinical
scholarship, real empathy is lacking. Some of the young star scholars admit
they sometimes make the mistake of thinking they know what the client
wants, and imagine that they are able to tell the client's stories as he or she
would want them told. 38 Real empathy, putting the client first and getting
fully inside the client's mind and experience, is rare."
HUNGER OF MEMORY (1981); THOMAS SowELL, CivIL RIGHTS: RHEnoRIc OR REALITY (1984); SHELBY
STEELE, THR CONT o
F' OUR CHRAcrE (1990).

32. See JANE ADDAms, TwENm' YEARS AT HULL-HoUsE (Signet Classic 1981) (1910);
HANDBOOK OF SEIrLEMENTs (Robert A. Woods & Albert J. Kennedy eds., Arno Press, 1970) (1911)
(describing the education these houses provided for their members); HowARD J. KAROER, THE
SENTINELS OF ORnER: A STUDY OF SOCL. CONTROL AND T

MINNEAPOLIS SETrLEMENT HOUSE

MovnmNrr. 1915-1950 (1987); HARRY P. KRAUS, THE SEramaumr HOUSE MOVEMENT INNew YORK

CrrY, 1886-1914 (1980).
33. See, e.g., ADDAMs, supra note 32; PEARL I. ELLIS, AMEmCANIzATON THROUGH HOMEMAKING
19-29 (1929) (describing course of instruction for Mexican immigrant girls in U.S. schools); KARoER,
supra note 32.
34. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: IntegrationIdeals and ClientInterests in School
DesegregationLitigation, 85 YALB L.J. 470 (1976).

35. Id at 470-72, 482-93.
36. See infra notes 51, 89, 121-123, 141-146, and accompanying text.
37. On "Kowalski," Rodrigo's young and equally brilliant conservative friend and colleague, see
Delgado, Tenth Chronicle,.supra note 1, at 1713.
38. See infra notes 40-44, 51, 89, 121-124, 135-147, and accompanying text (discussing empathy
in clinical theory).
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"So, you are saying," I summarized, "that when a white empathizes
with a black, it's always a white-black that he or she has in mind. The
white surmises what he would be like if he were black, but with his same
wants, needs, perspectives, and history. All grounded in white experience,
of course."3 9
"Right. False empathy, a sentimental, breast-beating kind, is common
among white liberals, and is the mirror opposite of false consciousness,
Gramsci's notion."
"Nice and neat," I said. "Like the periodic table." In truth, I was a bit
stunned by the clear polarity Rodrigo had just outlined. His false empathy
construct went some way, I thought, toward explaining how decades of liberal civil rights and legislative policy have left our people only marginally
better off.
"False empathy is not just an elegant explanation," Rodrigo continued. "It has real consequences for civil rights strategy. With false consciousness, a person of color identifies with and adopts the consciousness of
the oppressor, in this case a white. With false empathy, a white pretends to
understand and sympathize with a black. Each is counterfeit. The first
type, the upward climber, is readily recognized and unmasked. These are
the Great Gatsbys, and they tend to be objects of ridicule by both whites
and blacks. 4° The second, false empathy, is likewise despised-but by
blacks. We see through it, know by a kind of instinct that these folks won't
be with us when trouble comes down. 4 Derrick Bell got it right in his
Serving Two Masters article.42 Gerald L6pez, in Rebellious Lawyering,4 3
did, too. But some of the top clinical theorists are getting it wrong, satisfying themselves and their clients with too little. A recent article shows how
cognitive- and narrative-theory barriers render empathy difficult, a mechanism the authors call the 'empathic fallacy."'"
"You make it sound as though the problem lies mostly on the white
folks' side. Don't our people sometimes commit the same mistakes?"4'
39. See, e.g., SPamnAN, supra note 25, at 12 (describing "boomerang perception" in which "white
children like me... were told by well-meaning white adults that Black people were just like us-never,
however, that we were just like Blacks."); see also Ward, supra note 25, at 942-45.
40. See F. Scotr Frrua.zr.n, THE GREAT GATsBY (1925) (describing an upward-climbing
opportunist who seeks to attain social recognition through calculated means; Gatsby is unmasked,
however, when he cannot suppress his lower-class origins in interacting with the Long Island gentry).
41. See Thomas B. Edsall, "New" Image ofDemocrats Emerges Under Clinton, WASH. POST,
Jan. 27, 1994, at A6.
42. See Bell, Serving Two Masters, supra note 34.
43.

GERALD P. L6Paz, REBELuIous LAWYERiNG: ONE CIucANo's VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW

PRAcncE (1992).
44. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 25, at 1261, 1281; see also Lucie E. White, Seeking ".. The
Faces of Otherness. .. ": A Response to ProfessorsSara Felstiner,and Cahn, 77 CoRmLL L. Rv.
1499, 1508-11 (1992).
45. I was thinking, for example, of how no black civil rights organization had filed an amicus brief
in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding exclusion, relocation, and internment of
Japanese Americans does not violate Fourteenth Amendment), and of how some men of color still
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"They do, sometimes." Rodrigo conceded. "Although I think less frequently. Most whites lack double consciousness. 4" As members of the
majority culture, they have little practice viewing experience from two perspectives at once. We have to do so regularly."
"Someone who is in the grip of false empathy has a shallow identification with the other," I added. "He or she walks on the surface, uses the
wrong metaphors and comparisons.4 7 It's a little bit like false piety, like
those folks who go to church on Sunday but don't allow themselves to be
seized by real religion."
"The most unsympathetic thing you can do is to think you have empathy with those of a radically different background. You can easily end up
hurting them."
"You mean by doing the wrong thing, by not supplying what they
need?" I asked.
"Even worse than that," Rodrigo replied. "Are you familiar with the
story of La Malinche?"
I was silent for a moment, straining to remember. "You mean Hernan
Cortts's translator?"
"Yes," Rodrigo replied. "I was talking with one of my Latina students
the other day about her. La Malinche was a Native American woman who
served as Cortts's translator. She ended up helping Cortes destroy her own
people."49
"I think our Mexican friends have a phrase for it."
patronize the women in their lives. See Delgado, Sixth Chronicle, supra note 1, at 647 (discussing this
and other unlovely traits).
46. For the classic description of double consciousness, in which blacks see themselves
simultaneously from two perspectives-from that of the outside world, in which they are ignored or
despised, and from their own, in which they are empowered and free, see W.E.B. Du Bois, THE SouLs
OF BLAcK FOLK 1-12 (Kraus-Thomson 1973) (1903):
It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self
through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in
amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his two-ness,--an American, a Negro; two souls,
two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged
strength alone keeps it from being tom asunder.
Id. at 3; see also RALPH ELLiSON, INvIsmLE MAN 3-7 (1952).
47. On the way metaphors and analogies can sometimes flatten and decrease understanding of the
other's situation, see generally SP~muAN, supra note 25 (discussing the role of categories and conceptual
errors in confining thought related to women and women's roles). See Trina Grillo & Stephanie M.
Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The Implications of Making Comparisons Between
Racism and Sexism (Or Other -Isms), 1991 DuKE LJ. 397, 398 ('The analogy makes the analogizer
forget the difference and allows her to stay focused on her own situation without grappling with the
other person's reality."); Ward, supra note 25, at 944-45 (discussing the limits of "projective" empathy).
48. I am grateful to Margaret Montoya for this example. Private communication from Professor
Montoya, June 1995.
49. On Cort~s's (and La Malinche's) role, see, e.g., 1 Wiutm H. PREscoTr, HisTORY OF THE
CoNQuEsT OF MEmco bk. II, ch. V, at 184-86, bk. III, ch. V, at 296 (Everyman's Library 1909) (1847);
see generally BERNAL DIAz DEL CASTLLO, THE DiscovERY AND CONQUESt OF MExIco 1517-1521
(A.P. Maudslay trans., 1956) (providing contemporary account of the conquest by participant in three
expeditions, including that of Cortes).
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"They do," Rodrigo replied. "La traducci6nes traici6no Translation
is treason. One who moves too easily back and forth between different
communities can end up betraying the one with the least power, simply by
making its secrets accessible to the other. Clinical theorists, some with the
most impeccably liberal credentials, worry that they are doing something
similar when they spill a client's stories out on the pages of a law review for
all to read. 5 1
I stood up to switch my espresso machine to warm. "I'd love to come
back to this later, Professor," Rodrigo remarked. "But can I interest you in
a bite of dinner? I think I'm hungry, after all."
"You certainly can," I replied, looking at my watch. "And if we hurry,
we can get to some good places before they fill up."
II
RODRIGO EXPLAINS

How EMPATHY, LuE KNOWLEDGE,

REPRODUCES

HImRARCHY AND WHY GENUINE
SYMPATHY IS IN SHORT SUPPLY

We walked briskly down the sidewalk in front of my law school. "Is
Vietnamese okay?" I asked. "This new place opened a couple of months
ago. I haven't been there yet, but everyone tells me the food is great and
the service good."
"Cool," Rodrigo replied casually. A few minutes later we were seated
in a comfortable booth in the homey, dark restaurant. While waiting for the
waiter to take our orders, I picked up our discussion where we had left off
in my office. "Rodrigo, let me see if I understand you. Are you saying that
empathy is bad, per se, or that it is good, but there is too little of the real
article to go around?"
"In a way, both," Rodrigo replied, looking up at the waiter who had
just brought our menus. After examining our options, we ordered appetizers and beverages (yet another cup of coffee for my irrepressible friend,
herbal tea for me). "Empathy can harm if it's not genuine, as it often is not.
Like knowledge, it has a power dimension. 52 Empathy reproduces hierarchy. And the real kind, true empathy, is in extremely rare supply."
"Tell me about how the false, or superficial kind reproduces hierarchy," I asked. I had just been reading about the sociology of knowledge,
50. See supra note 48.
51. C.f Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator,Representation as Text: Towards An
Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CoRNELL L. REv. 1298, 1383-84 (1992) (describing how client

insisted on being named in article so as not to replicate the anonymity he experienced throughout his
case).
52. See McHE FOUCAULT, PowERfKNowLmrGo: S.acrED INTERvIEws AND OmER WRITINGS
1972-1977 (Colin Gordon ed. & Colin Gordon et al. trans., 1980).
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and was intrigued by Rodrigo's notion that emotions might reinforce the
status quo just as knowledge does. 3
"We mentioned the case of La Malinche a minute ago. A member of
the oppressed group tells the oppressor what it wants to know. The more
powerful group then uses the information to destroy the translator's group."
"The translator is a dupe, in other words," I said.
"It works the other way, as well," Rodrigo went on. "Some liberals
write about horrible conditions in the community, believing that others will
want to remedy them. Their readers may draw the opposite conclusion,
however-that minorities are lazy, slothful, like to live that way, and so
on.5 4 And there is a third way, in which the liberal does not actively harm
the member of the weaker group, but merely does him no good. The Good
Samaritan offers the wrong sort of rescue.
"Like the Settlement House ladies we were talking about before. They
taught Italian immigrants how to cook and eat American food, although
they already had perfectly satisfactory recipes and cuisines. The ladies
urged immigrant mothers to use bottles and infant formula instead of breast
feeding, which they considered un-American and not modem. 5 5
"It's what you were saying earlier," I interjected. "When we visualize
helping another person, we end up helping ourselves in the form of that
other person.5 6 A white helps a black who is, in effect white: a postulated
recipient who will like and appreciate what the white would have wanted
had the white been in exactly that situation. A church group helps the starving, but makes them pray first."
53. See id.; see also THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF Scmmrrnc REVOLUTIONS (2d ed.
1970) (explaining that scientific research is based on paradigms, or key past scientific achievements, and
that revolutionary advancements in science do not occur until these paradigms are reinterpreted or
discarded).
54. E.g., OFIucE OF PoucY PLmNGo AND RESARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF LABoR, TH NEGRO
FAMILY: THE CAsE FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1965), which was written in an effort to understand and
help, is today considered virtually an argument for abandoning hope for that "pathological" institution,
the black family; see also Kmsn BUMnLLER, THE CWIL RIGHTS Socmurv: Tan SOCIAL CONSTuCTioN
OF VICTIMs (1988) (book by progressive scholar, based on interviews with victims of discrimination,
whose general thesis is used by some to argue against civil rights laws and enforcement on the ground
that they simply encourage a victim mentality); DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, FAMLY AIM NATON (1986);
CHARLES J. SYiEs, A NATION OF VICMS: Tan DECAY OF THE AMEICAN CHARACTER (1992)
(lamenting the "politics of victimization" in U.S. society); PATRICIA A. TURNER, I HEARD IT TRouon
TH GRAPEviNE: RUMOR INAnFICAN AMEuCAN CULURE. (1993) (describing urban myths that circulate
in the black community as efforts to increase solidarity and empowerment; however, drawing attention
to these myths may risk making the community look ignorant and ridiculous). On the possibility that
"imaginative" empathy can reinforce hierarchy, see Ward, supra note 25, at 949-52.
55. See supra note 32.
56. See supra notes 34-39. On this danger, see also LAwRENcE C. BEcKR, RECIPROCrrY 158-59
(1986); Henderson, supra note 25, at 1651; Duncan Kennedy, Distributiveand PaternalistMotives in
Contract and Tort Law, With SpecialReference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal BargainingPower,
41 MD.L. Rsv. 563 (1982). On the difficulty of cross-cultural identification and empathy, see CLIrORD
GEERtz, LOCAL KNowLEDGE: FUTiHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIvE ANTHROPOLOGY 55-70 (1983).
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"I'm sure you've noticed, Professor, that people almost always give
presents that they would like to receive themselves?"
I remembered with a pang a time or two when my late wife had
scolded me for doing something similar. "It's something of a joke with
married folks," I said. "The husband gives the wife a lug wrench. She
gives him two tickets to the opera, and so on."
"So you see what I mean about the way empathy reproduces power
relations," Rodrigo said. "And also how it can sometimes amount to outright betrayal."
We fell silent while the waiter set down our appetizers, some sort of
skewered chicken for my rail-thin friend, a pungent hot-and-sour soup for
me.
"You were also going to explain why it is in such short supply," I said,
ladling myself a spoonful of the steaming delicacy. "The real kind, I mean.
And I believe you were also going to explain why the other kind is not
merely harmful, but can kill."
Rodrigo removed his chicken morsels from the skewer, neatly speared
one with his fork, and began:
A.

Rodrigo Explains Why Empathy Is in Short Supply

"Empathy ought to benefit the possessor," Rodrigo explained,
"because it enables him or her to make beneficial trades. If one has the
ability to perceive what the other person wants, one can offer him or her
that and get what one wants in return. Our law and economics friends
would say it promotes marketplace efficiency. 7 Empathic people ought to
get ahead. The capacity ought to confer an evolutionary advantage,
enabling its possessors not merely to be good parents, friends, and lovers,
but good traders, politicians, and marketers."
"But you believe things are not working out that way?" I asked.
"No. For some reason, the evolutionary momentum seems to have
stopped, even reversed itself, with respect to people of color. I've been
trying to figure out why this is so."
"No one can doubt that it is. Civil rights, affirmative action, Head
Start, and dozens of other programs necessary to our people are under
attack."8 The codes used by politicians and writers when casting aspersions
57. E.g., RicHARD A. Pos'NE, ECONOMIC ANALYsIs OF LAW (4th ed. 1992) (arguing that law

should promote the maximization of voluntary trades and transactions in order to satisfy individual and
market preferences).

58. See e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995); ANDREw HACKER, Two
NATIONS: BLACK AN WmTE, SEPARATE, Hos'ntr, UNEQuAL 50-52, 93-133 (1992); Amy Wallace, UC
Decision Threatens Diversit, Report Finds, L.A. TudEs, Dec. 14, 1995, at A3 (describing predicted

impact of decision to end affirmative action in University of California admissions); Yumi Wilson, AntiAffrmative Action Drive Begins, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 29, 1995, at A26 (describing proposed California

ballot initiative that would abolish most state affimative action programs).
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on us have become blatant and obvious.5 9 Black parents believe that things
are now the worst they have been in more than a century, that their children
will be denied jobs or educational opportunities because of discrimination,
and that their sons are in constant danger from violence and drugs.6" And I
gather you think this is not just an aberration or part of an ordinary political
cycle."
"I wish it were," Rodrigo replied. "But the downturn in our fortunes is
more serious than that. I think the increasing bureaucratization of modem
life" may account for part of the decrease in empathy and patience for the
downtrodden. Modem social relations are apt to be distant and perfunctory.
We may run across a few people of radically different classes or races from
time to time, but we seldom interact closely with them. A new branch of
social psychology called norm theory6 2 may supply part of the answer, as
well."
I strained my memory. "Norm theory?" I asked.
"Yes. Norm theory holds that our reaction to another person in distress varies according to the normalcy or abnormalcy of his or her plight in
our eyes. 63 If you see an upper-class white family being evicted from their
nice suburban home, you feel alarmed because you know that sort of situation is abnormal for them. You realize they must be experiencing real distress. But if you see starving Biafrans on TV, you feel less empathy
because you know that is their ordinary situation. Famines are common in
that part of the world, so your heart does not go out to them as it would to a
neighbor who materialized on your doorstep not having eaten in eight
days.
"I've read of experiments dealing with helping behavior that appear to
bear that out," I said. "In one, a black man in the subway asks for change
for a quarter and is refused; a white man does the same and is given
59. 1 thought of Willie Horton, and Jesse Helms's "white hands" commercial, and of the Wall
Street Journal's "quota queen" slur on Lani Guinier. Also of the way many politicians have been
rallying around such neo-nativist themes as immigration control and English Only, which are aimed at
making life difficult for Latinos and other recent arrivals. See, e.g., Richard Lacayo, For Whom the Bell
Curves: A New Book Raises a Ruckus by Linking Intelligence to Genetics and Race, Tusa, Oct. 24,
1994, at 66; Tom Tancredo, Make a Candidate Sweat-Ask About Illegal Immigrants, DENVER Posr,
Apr. 30, 1995, at lE; Anthony Walton, Willie Horton and Me, N.Y. TiMEs, Aug. 20, 1989, § 6
(Magazine), at 52; Isabel Wilkerson, Racial Harassment Altering Blacks' Choices on Colleges, N.Y.

Tiats, May 9, 1990, at Al.
60.

Richard Whitmire, "Major Crisis"forBlack Children:Adults in Poll: It's Worst Times Since

Slavery, DmvEr PosT, May 27, 1994, at 2A.
61. See Richard Delgado, Norms and NormalScience: Toward a Critique of Normativity in Legal
Thought, 139 U. PA. L. REV.933, 957 (1991); Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politicsof Form, 139

U. PA. L. REV.801 (1991) (discussing use of normative discourse by bureaucrats interested in routine
and sameness).
62. See, e.g., Daniel Kabneman & Dale T. Miller, Norm Theory: Comparing Reality to Its
Alternatives, 93 PSYCHOL. REy. 136 (1986).

63. "The event will then appear normal if it confirms expectations, abnormal or surprising if it
violates them." Idaat 137.

1996]

EMPATHY AND FALSE EMPATHY

change." I had thought these experiments manifested simple racism, but
maybe they illustrate your phenomenon as well. Everyone assumes the
black person has a rough road in life, so hardly anyone will stop to help."
65
"Experiments with stranded motorists show much the same thing,"
Rodrigo added. "Norm theory explains why empathy decreases over time,
even though it would seem to benefit the possessor. The poorer and more
wretched blacks become, the less white people will empathize with them.
They will dismiss our cries of pain, thinking to themselves that they are part
of our normal condition."
"And the poorer and more wretched we become, the less we will have
to offer in trade. Empathy with us will be useless. Who wants to trade with
a slave who has nothing to offer? There is no reason for empathy with one
who is permanently destitute."
"My point exactly," Rodrigo continued. "Empathy is least useful
where we need it most. When inequality is deep and structural, empathy
declines. It's a downward spiral. Empathy would work in a just world, one
in which everyone's experience or access to resources was roughly the
same. But we don't live in a world like that."
"Is there any solution, any hope?" I asked.
"The only one I see is to show that our people have something to offer
whites. We were talking about this the first time we met.6 6 If one can
convince white folks in elite positions that blacks are necessary to them,
have something to offer, our treatment will shift overnight, as it did in wartime.67 The prevailing narratives and myths will change magically to facilitate the trades and exchanges, services, and so on that the dominant group
needs. None of this will take place on a conscious level."
"The trouble is that many of them seem ready to write us off. The
Republicans now realize they don't need our votes. They can count on
backlash voters, angry white males, 6 8 while the Democrats seem not to
want us, either. 69 And, if I understand your argument, our few remaining
64. See Faye Crosby et al., Recent Unobtrusive Studies of Black and White Discriminationand
Prejudice:A LiteratureReview, 87 PSYCHOL. BuLL.546, 548-52 (1980) (reviewing extensive "helping
behavior" studies on American racism).
65. See Stephen G. West etal., Helping a Motorist in Distress: The Effects of Sex, Race, and
Neighborhood, 31 J. PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 691, 693-94 (1975) (finding that victims were
helped primarily by persons of the same race: 97% of those who helped black victims were black, while
94% of those who helped white victims were white); see also Crosby et al., supra note 64, at 548-52
(finding motorists more likely to help stranded person of their own race).
66. Delgado, Chronicle, supra note I, at 1366-76 (arguing for the need to provide whites a self-

interested basis to support affirmative action and racial justice).
67. Id. On the economic-determinist (interest convergence) view of civil rights law, see DERRICK
A. BELt., JR., RAcE, RAci mS,AND A mucA LAw 1-51 (3d ed. 1992); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v.
Board of Education and the Interest-ConvergenceDilemma, 93 HALv. L. Rsv. 518, 522-33 (1980).
68. On the backlash vote and role of angry white males, see David Gates, White Male Paranoia,
NEwswEEK, Mar. 29, 1993, at 48.
69. See Richard Delgado, Zero-Based, Racial Politics: An Evaluation of Three Best-Case

Arguments on Behalf ofthe Nonwhite Underclass, 78 GEo. LU. 1929 (1990) (arguing that the nonwhite
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liberal friends can't be counted on because their empathy is shallow. They
think they know what we need, but don't. They visualize themselves in our
70
places, and ask what they, themselves, would want."
"False empathy is worse than indifference, Professor. It encourages
the possessor to believe he is beyond reproach. It's like a certain type of
religiosity. If you believe you are saved, you can easily come to believe
that you can do no wrong. 71 Because you believe in God, you will believe
you are God, or at least that you're in tight with Him. He's on your side;
you understand each other. Once you reach this point, you can do no evil,
as you are God-or at least His messenger."
"You will then think you are being extremely empathic, as the Spanish
conquistadores did, because you are acting on behalf of God in the other
person.7" Not what that other person is, but what he or she might be. The
other person may not believe he or she has that God in him or her. But you
will know better. Is that your general idea?" I asked.
"Yes," Rodrigo said. "In fact, I'm reminded that studies like the helping experiments we were talking about have shown that religious people did
not help out any more than non-believers. 73 For example, in one experiment, seminary students were no more likely than anyone else walking
down the street to stop to help a man who was slumped over and groaning
in a doorway. Ironically, some of the students were on their way to give a
talk on the parable of the Good Samaritan."7 4
"So ideology of all sorts decreases empathy," I summarized. "It
allows one to exclude different or challenging ideas as outside the accepted
paradigm. And the more politically fractured our nation becomes, the less
75
important will seem its commitment to racial justice and help for the poor.
Religiosity also decreases empathy, all things being equal,76 as does
bureaucraey. 77 And the conditions of modem life add a fourth element: as
the gap in earnings and family wealth between blacks and whites grows
poor should consider "zero-based" politics, including throwing support behind the liberal wing of the
Republican party).
70. See supra notes 32-56 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 61, at 954-55.
72. On some of the cruelties committed by the early conquistadores, see generally DIAz, supra

note 49. See also

HENRY KAMEN, INQUISITION AND SOCIErY IN SPAIN

N THE SIXTEENTH AND

SEvENTEENm CENTURmS (1985). On a U.S. experience, see ARThUR MmLER, The Crucible, in
CoLLEcrED PLAYs (1957) (giving fictional account of the Salem witch trials).
73. See Alfie Kohn, Between God and Good: Research Shows Believers Are No More Likely to
Love Their Neighbor Than Nonbelievers, S.F. CHRON. & ExAmiNER, July 8, 1990, Tins WoRLD, at 15
(summarizing various studies of helping behavior).
74. l On the false piety of self-righteous belief, see Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression,
98 YA L. . 1559 (1989) (describing minorities' perception of bias despite the legal system's expressed
commitment to egalitarian ideals).
75. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text (summarizing this argument).
76. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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wider, there is less to trade.7" With the decreased reward in understanding
and empathizing with the other, empathy naturally decreases. And the
poorer those others get, the more norm theory clicks in. Their poverty
begins to seem natural and unsurprising, and thus there is no urgent need to
remedy their misery."
"And don't forget the decreasing pie," Rodrigo added. "The slowing

of job and income growth for the middle class, combined with the competition from foreign workers and markets,7 9 means that there is correspondingly less empathy to go around. The reason is that socioeconomic
competition, as you know, increases racism as well as decreases empathy.8 0
As one's own well-being and security decrease, one looks to oneself and
one's friends. Expanding markets give a reason for increased empathy:
since one is in a position to make trades, understanding other people and
their needs confers an advantage.8" One can trade with the newcomers.
Bad times cause you to hunker down and conserve what you already have.
During human evolution, the main function of empathy was to facilitate
bonding and solidarity, so that collectivities could form.8" But with racism,
a relatively new phenomenon, the attitude promotes white bonding, white
solidarity. This benefits elite whites, since it ensures that struggling white
workers won't turn against them. 3 And it consoles those workers. Even
though their share of the pie gets smaller and smaller, they can say to themselves that they're at least better off than the blacks.""
"In sum, six factors that augur little good for our people," I said. "A
pretty gloomy scenario, coming from someone as young and upbeat as you.
I hope you have a solution. Does it include law?"
78. On the wage gap between blacks and whites, see Spencer Rich, Blacks Lose Ground with Jobs
Despite Education Gains, Study Says, WASH. Posr, Apr. 30, 1995, at AS; Delgado, Chronicle, supra
note 1, app. D at 1382 (collecting sources).
79. Delgado, Chronicle supra note 1, at 1369-70, 1375, app. A at 1381.
80. On this socioeconomic theory of racism, see, e.g., GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF
PamunicE 224-25 (1954); JOEL KOVEL, VHITE RAcIsM: A PsvciOmrORy 44 (1970).
81. On empathy and trades, see supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
82. On this biological theory of empathy, see, e.g., Robert L. Trivers, The Evaluation of
ReciprocalAltruism, 46 Q. REv. BioLoGy 35 (1971); Frans B. M. De Waal, The Chimpanzee's Sense of
Social Regularity andIts Relation to the Human Sense ofJustice, in THE SENSE OF JusricE: BioLooicAL
FotnDA-rONS OF LAW 241 (Roger D. Masters & Margaret Grater eds., 1992).
83. Derrick Bell is one of the primary proponents of this functional view of racism. See BELL,
supra note I (arguing that white prejudice unites working-class and elite whites and keeps the former
from challenging the latter); Bell, Brown v. Board of Education, supra note 67, at 525-26 (arguing that
poorer whites had relied on expectation that elite whites would enforce poor whites' superior social
status over blacks, and felt betrayed by whites who supported desegregation).
84. BELL, supra note 1; see also Derrick Bell, Racism: A Prophecyfor the Year 2000, 42
RuTrars L. REv. 93, 96-108 (1989) (recounting and analyzing The Chronicle of the Space Traders;
arguing that the costs of social remedies are invariably placed either on blacks themselves or on lowerclass whites, and that a prime mechanism of white supremacy is to ensure that lower-class whites view
blacks as their enemies rather than the elite whites who benefit from their oppression); Derrick Bell,
After We're Gone: PrudentSpeculationson America in a Post-RacialEpoch, 34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 393
(1990) (presenting same chronicle in slightly revised form with additional commentary).
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"Oh, here's our waiter," ,Rodrigo interjected. "Can I tell you in a minute?" We both examined the menu in silence, while the waiter waited
patiently.
"I'll have number twenty-seven," Rodrigo'said.
"And I'll take thirteen. It doesn't have MSG, does it?" The waiter
shook his head no and departed with our orders.
"Doctor's orders," I
added to Rodrigo, who shot back a sympathetic look. We continued our
conversation as follows:
II
RODRIGO EXPLAINS WHY LAW Is NOT THE SOLUTION, AND
WHY WE NEED A DUE PROCESS OF LEGAL
STORYTELLING

"I do have a solution," Rodrigo replied, "but unfortunately it does not
include law. At first, I thought it might. After all, one does not need empathy to file a lawsuit. A judge does not need it to rule on technical motions,
or to see whether a complaint satisfies the elements of a statutory cause of
action. Many of these acts are mechanical, requiring no large amount of
judgment. In fact, some Race-Crits have advocated the formality of the
court setting as a positive advantage over nonformal dispute resolution,
such as mediation, for cases presenting an imbalance of power, as most
civil rights cases do. 5 Unfortunately, I think litigation is not a very promising avenue of relief for society's poorest, most disadvantaged classes."
"We talked in a general way about some of these things before," I
recalled. "I think it was the fourth time we met."8 6
"Your memory is good, Professor. We are not the only ones to question faith in law as an instrument of social reform. There are many others,
both on the left and on the right.8 7 But some think things would be better if
only we had more empathic judges, or ones with wider experience. 8 Some
think things would be better if lawyers just learned to tell better, more vivid,
stories in their pleadings, for example." 9
"But you think this would not help at all?" I said, a little dubiously.
"Less than we might hope," Rodrigo replied. "Law is structurally
biased against any display of empathy."
85. See

PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, TnE ALcHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS

146-48 (1991); Richard

Delgado et al.,
Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1359; Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangersfor
Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991).
86. Delgado,'Fourth Chronicle, supra note 1, at 1139-59; see also Delgado, Ninth Chronicle,
supra note 1 (observing that law is useful mainly in an instrumental sense).

87. See Richard Delgado, Enormous Anomaly? Left-Right Parallels in Recent Writing About
Race, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1547 (1991) (book review).
88. See Henderson, supra note 25.
89. See Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power: The Languageof Civil Rights Litigators,
104 YALE L.L 763 (1995); cf.Ward, supra note 25, at 944 (criticizing this view as utopian).
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"Is that because of your Inquispro example?" 90 I asked. "Namely,
because we do not really want law to be uniform and nonracist, treating
everyone alike. We want it to promote class advantage. If it didn't we'd
change the system back."
"That's part of it," Rodrigo replied. "But there's more. Even perfectly
unbiased judges, ones like Inquispro who treat blacks and whites absolutely
alike, would end up doing very little good. Incidentally, I think this is even
more true for lawyers but we'll come back to that later. Let's focus on law
at the more systemic level."
"Go ahead. I'm all ears," I said. "Why can't law redress the injuries
of society's most needy and oppressed? What about the Brown decision
and times like the sixties? Then, courts were in the forefront of the social
revolution: handing down decrees protecting civil rights protesters, desegregating schools and lunch counters, requiring due process in school disciplinary cases, and so on."
"True," Rodrigo conceded. "Unfortunately, that was an aberration.
Most of the time, courts are no more kindly disposed to us and our causes
than they are to any other group, perhaps even less so." 91
"And I assume you have a theory for why this is so?"
"I do-actually a group of explanations, corresponding to the different
roles of judges, lawyers, and litigation as a whole."
Rodrigo Explains Why Civil Rights Litigants Cannot Command the
Empathy They Should-There Is No Due Process of
Storytelling

A.

1.

The Litigants Themselves

"Let's take the litigants first," Rodrigo began. "Let's say you are a
plaintiff who has suffered a civil rights injury, maybe a black undergraduate
or member of a family injured by hate speech. You file suit, but soon find
out that it is very hard to tell your story in court. The legal system requires
that you tell a different narrative from the one that happened. Law slices up
your narrative into little bits, into unfamiliar pieces. The pleading rules
require a 'short and plain statement' of your claim, with each allegation
being 'simple, concise, and direct.'9 2 The law does contain master narratives corresponding fairly closely to commercial grievances, to what industrialists want to say about each other in antitrust cases for example.9 3 But it
contains few narratives that seem written to remedy injuries to less
90.
91.

See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, The Social Construction of Brown v. Board of

Education: Law Reform and the Reconstructive Paradox, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 547, 549-67 (1995)
(describing the Court's zigs and zags and minority interests' changing fortunes).
92. FED. R. Crv. P. 8(e)(1).
93. See, e.g., 2-2C JAY E. Gamauo, WEr's FEnERAL FoRms: DisTrCT CotuRTs, CvIL chs. 28-34
(4th ed. 1994) for a treatment of pleading rules and requirements in federal court.
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entrenched interests. There is no pleading form for 'You treated me
unfairly.' Thus, when a plaintiff starts to tell her story that her husband beat
her for ten years, we interrupt and say, 'Don't tell us that story, tell us about
imminent threats of death or violent injury. What was your husband about
to do to you when you killed him?' 94 This focus on the imminence of the
harm impairs the court's understanding of the totality of the harmful relationship. If it turns out the woman has nothing to tell of the official kind of
story, we tell her to keep quiet. She had no story after all."
"So the law requires her to tell a stylized story that might or might not
correspond to the injury she sustained."
"It can be even worse than that," Rodrigo continued. "Sometimes the
law requires you to tell the other story-the perpetrator's, not your own. 95
For example, in a civil rights complaint, you will end up having to tell and
prove to the court that the other side acted intentionally."
"That's Washington v. Davis,"96 I interjected. "The civil rights plaintiff has to prove that the defendant's conduct was intentionally discriminatory, not merely that it had a differential impact on persons like the
plaintiff."97
"Precisely," Rodrigo shot back. "And not only that, but the plaintiff
has to prove tight chains of causation between what the defendant did and
his or her injury."9 8
"And probably that the defendant had no legitimate business reason for
denying the plaintiff a job or promotion,"99 I added. "Half the plaintiff's
case does seem to concern the defendant, not the plaintiff, who, after all, is
the one who suffered the injury."
"Exactly. Consider the hate-speech case we mentioned a minute ago.
The defendant, let's say, has burned a cross on the family's lawn.100 Or a
group of fraternity kids shouts, 'Nigger, go back to Africa; you don't
belong on this campus,' to an eighteen-year-old black undergraduate. 10 1 If
this case goes to court, the defendant immediately turns it into a First
94. Self-defense is generally only available if the threat is severe and imminent. SANFom H.
KADISH, Er AL., CR M NAL LAW AND ITS PROCEssES: CAsES Am MATERIALS (4th ed. 1983). See also
Lucie E. White, Subordination,RhetoricalSurvival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of
Mrs. G., 38 Butn. L. RE,. 1, 19-52 (1990) (describing the difficulty one welfare recipient faced telling

her story at a benefits hearing).
95. See infra notes 100-106 and accompanying text.
96. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
97. Id. at 238-48.
98. On causation in civil rights cases, see, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 493-511 (1989); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329-36 (1986); Firefighters Local Union No.
1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 578-83 (1984); Bell, supra note 83, at 170-73.
99. On the role of the "BFOQ," (bona fide occupational qualification) in civil rights law, see, e.g.,
MACK A. PLAYER, ENPLoYmENT DicsRiMrATiO N LAw § 5.29, at 280-95 (student ed. 1988).
100. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
101. For a review of this and similar incidents justifying anti-hate speech rules, see Richard
Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: ConstitutionalNarratives in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. Ray. 343,
348-58 (1991).
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Amendment issue. The case will turn on whether he or she had a right to
bum the cross or yell the epithet. You, who were merely walking home
from the library late at night, or trying to sleep in your room at home, will
find yourself on the defensive, depicted as someone who was trying to take
10 2
away the precious free-speech rights of the skinhead or bigot."'
"Indeed," I said. "We both know abridgments of the First Amendment
are a dangerous precedent if more voices are to be heard in our society. Yet
we know how hate speech tends to silence and decrease the exchange of
ideas, and how not all categories of speech are equally deserving of protection."'1 3 I paused momentarily, and glanced around the restaurant. "I see
what you mean by the narratives all being against you. In fact, I was just
re-reading Scalia's opinion in the St. Paul cross-burning case the other day.
He hardly mentions the family at all. They were an abstraction, almost
entirely missing from the opinion, which concerns speech categories,
the dangers of censorship, and what Scalia calls 'viewpoint
discrimination.' "'
"A more perfect irony could not be imagined," Rodrigo continued.
"The Jones family, who awoke to find a cross burning on their lawn,
and the city that intervened on their behalf, considered guilty of
discrimination!"

I paused for a moment while the waiter set down our food, a vegetarian stir fry for me and chicken in a lime-coconut curry for Rodrigo.
"Looks fantastic," Rodrigo said, thanking our server.

"So," I summarized, "the plaintiff often does not get to tell her story at
all. Even when she does, it's rarely the one the plaintiff naturally would
tell. She cannot 'go back to the beginning.' She often finds that things she
thought vital to the claim are irrelevant and cannot be told. The court inter-

rupts, makes her tell her story in little slices, in response to direct examination. The other side gets to object every thirty seconds. Most of the
'material elements' concern the defendant and what she did. It's only when

we get to the issue of damages that the plaintiff really gets to tell about
herself and about what happened to her. The law makes one take what Alan

Freeman calls the perpetrator perspective. Have I caught your meaning?"
102. On this ironic juxtaposition, see Charles R. Lawrence III, Crossburning and the Sound of
Silence: AntisubordinationTheory and the FirstAmendment, 37 ViLL. L. REv. 787, 803-04 (1992) ("If
First Amendment doctrine and theory is to truly serve First Amendment ideals, it must recognize the
injury done by the private suppression of speech... ");
see also Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to
Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MicH. L. REv. 2320, 2326-41 (1989) (describing
injuries of victims of hate speech, injuries of which the law often fails to take account).
103. See Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and
Name Calling, in MAm J. MATStJDA, Er A.., WoRDs TAT woUND: CnmcAL RAcE THEoRy,
AssAuLTIVE SPEECH, AND a Fmsr AmENrNs
122-33 (1993) (discussing silencing effect of hate
speech and noting that the First Amendment protects some forms of speech-for example, social
vituperation-but not others such as libel, official secrets, fighting words, and disrespectful words
uttered to a judge or other authority figure).
104. R.A.V, 505 U.S. 377; Lawrence, supra note 102, at 788-91.
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"You have."
"It does sound dire," I said. "But surely, Rodrigo, there have to be
some limits on storytelling, as you call it. Otherwise, trials would be interminable. Pleading rules exist for good reason. Without them, anyone could
go to court and enter any old generalized grievance against anyone else."
"True," Rodrigo replied. "But law makes our types of grievances particularly difficult to bring."
"Then maybe the solution is to litigate more, not less-to get the law
to recognize new causes of action. Then it would become possible to tell
new narratives, as happened with the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, for example.' 05 It took time for the legal system to recognize sexual harassment of women in the workplace. Before Catharine
MacKinnon's path-breaking work, women could not tell those stories in
court.10 6 Today they can. Maybe our people will eventually be able to tell
their stories."
"I doubt it," Rodrigo replied gloomily. "The courts' and the country's
mood is all in the other direction. American society is impatient with what
they call 'activist judges.'10 7 We believe the rights revolution has gone too
far. Affirmative action is under attack.'
The dominant narratives of the
sixties and seventies have shifted back toward a traditional and morally
conservative posture. In the sixties, African Americans were long-suffering
victims or righteous warriors. Then, the images changed to those of terrifying gangsters and Black Power advocates. 10 9 In the last decade, we've
had the Willie Hortons and Cadillac-owning lazy welfare cheat, the affirmative action hire who lacks 'traditional merit criteria' and blocks the promotion of a supposedly more deserving white."' '
"So it is in the hate-speech debate," I said, returning to Rodrigo's previous example. "There, the narrative of harm is given short shrift, even
though quite provable."' Courts and commentators quickly substitute the
105. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON

ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON ThE LAW OF TORTS § 12

at 54-56

(5th ed. 1984) (on the comparatively recent recognition of this tort); Regina Austin, Employer Abuse,
Worker Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1

(1988).
106.

See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARAssmNr

oF
W

o

WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX

DISCRIMINATION (1979).

107.

E.g., ROBERT F. NAGEL, CoNSTTrTtoNAL CULTURES: TmE MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES

oF JUDICIAL REvIEw (1989).

108. See supra notes 58, 68 and accompanying text.
109. On popular images of African Americans and other minorities of color, see Delgado &
Stefancic, supra note 25, at 1262-75; see also Richard Delgado, Storytellingfor Oppositionists and

Others: A Pleafor Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2411, 2437-41 (1989) (arguing that "counterstories"
have the potential to change complacent majority narratives despite the difficulty of conveying them in
court).
110. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 25, at 1262-67, 1290 n.221.
111. See Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and
Name-Calling, 17 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rsv. 133 (1982) (describing how racist, assaultive speech injures

its victims).
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wholly unproven narrative of censorship, as though every campus that
enacts a mild hate-speech rule will immediately turn into an Orwellian
nightmare with Big Brother looking over everyone's shoulder.1 12 This is
quite speculative, and, in my opinion, extremely unlikely. Or take another
narrative, the chilling effect that speakers are said to suffer if any speechlimiting code, like a hate-speech rule, is put into place. Set that alongside
the terror, demoralization, and high dropout rates that are provably associated with campus hate speech, as dozens of studies show.1 13 Which one is
more demonstrable? One finds that all the prevailing narratives enable elite
and not-so-elite whites to do what they are accustomed to doing, and then
defend it in court. They have all these narratives going for them: Big
Brother, the state as censor, the terrified speaker just waiting to be chilled,
and the thin-skinned hypersensitive black just waiting to run to the authorities instead of shrugging it off."
I sat back. "I'm beginning to see why you have little faith in the legal
system to solve our empathy crisis. Still, earnest, impassioned talking
sometimes works. What about Brown v. Board ofEducation?"4 And what
about your own success in talking your way out of trouble with your captors. Did you not succeed in getting them to empathize with you?"
"We were about the same age and political orientation. They let me
talk without interruption. Actually, I talked a blue streak for fifteen minutes, afraid for my life. Plus, I had something they wanted, namely that I
would go away without making trouble."
"They afforded you full due process of storytelling. In that respect,
your situation was not parallel with the one that prevails in most courts."
"Not at all. But several other features reduce the possibility of empathy in that situation," Rodrigo continued. "Not only do we make it difficult
for plaintiffs to tell their story. Consider how we treat witnesses."
2.

Witnesses

"You're going to say rudely, I bet. I've just been reading about a
famous criminal trial where many witnesses got raked over the coals and
left the courtroom feeling impugned and maligned, even though they were
just trying to do their job, namely, to tell what they saw.""'
"Exactly," Rodrigo replied. "Let's say the plaintiff tries to bring in
some friends to help him tell his story. These are people who know someAL., SPEAKING OF RACE, SPEAKING OF Sax: HATE SPEECH, CIVIL
112. E.g., HENRY L. GATES, JR.
RirHs, Ar CIvIL LmERTIEs (1994) (depicting in often terrifying fashion the parade of horribles likely
to ensue if hate-speech rules are enacted).
113. See THE PRICE WE PAY: TE CASE AGAIsT RACIST SPEECH, HATE PROPOGANDA AND
PoeRxoRAHY (L. Lederer & Richard Delgado eds., 1995) (containing empirical studies and first-person
accounts).

114. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
115. On the harsh treatment of witnesses in the recent murder trial of O.J. Simpson, see, e.g.,
Circus in the Courtroom (Editorial),BOULDER, CO, DAmLY CAMERA, Apr. 26, 1995, at 2-C.
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thing about the event that gave rise to the lawsuit, say, the act of discrimination. The witness soon learns that in our legal culture it is okay to treat
witnesses with suspicion and contempt. The other side gets to badger them,
' 16
imply they might be lying, insinuate all sorts of unsavory motives.",
"Yet we insist that everyone treat the lawyers and judge with the greatest respect. Anyone who stood up in court and said that the prosecutor or
judge might be lying or biased would be treated as having done something
scandalous. Yet we do this sort of thing with plaintiffs' witnesses
routinely."
"And with women who bring charges of rape," 17 Rodrigo added.
"In the courtroom, certain types of emotional display will get you a
contempt citation; others will not. Judges can shout, interrupt, and show
exasperation or disbelief. But the plaintiff, her attorney, and the witnesses
are expected to be models of decorum."
"Emotional rules are the underside of power and ideology," Rodrigo
said. "It's okay for an empowered actor, say, your boss, to be angry at you.
But you may not show anger at your boss. 1 It's the same way in court.
There is always a power imbalance visible in courtroom interaction, conveyed in who speaks first, who interrupts, and who gets to paraphrase and
sum up at the end."
"It's true," I said, taking the devil's advocate position, "that plaintiffs
and witnesses find their roles limited in court by rules of evidence, relevancy, cross-examination, and so on. But that's the way things are in an
adversary system. There have to be some rules, or else it would be a freefor-all and things would be even worse for what you call disempowered
litigants. Aren't you forgetting that every plaintiff has a perfect counterbalance to all this power and cumbersome machinery that is deployed against
him in court, namely the attorney, a gladiator trained to negotiate the maze
of court rules, professionally and ethically bound to represent the client to
the best of her ability. Doesn't the lawyer cancel all or most of that power
imbalance out?"

116. Id.; see also Sharon E. Cairns, A Proposal for Critical Research on Emotional Expression and
Display Rules in -the American Courtroom (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(describing how discourse rules govern shows of emotion).
117. On the reform of rape law, see SusAN EsTRmcH, REAL RAPE (1987).
118. For studies of these unwritten rules of etiquette and practice in lawyer-client relations, see
Bryna Bogoch, Power,Distance and Solidarity:Models of Professional-ClientInteraction in an Israeli

Legal Aid Setting, 5 DISCOURSE & Soc'y 65,76 (1994) (observing that client expressions of emotion are
"frowned upon" in lawyer-client interactions: "[T]he lawyer challenges the legal relevance of the
client's emotional objectives. [The lawyer's] goals are the ones that count, because in [the]
traditional
style of lawyer-client interaction it is the lawyer who determines what is relevant."); Bryna Bogoch &
Brenda Danet, Challenge and Control in Lawyer-Client Interaction:A Case Study in an IsraeliLegal

Aid Office, 4 TXr 249 (1984) (describing how lawyers assume and convey a superior social and
intellectual status through language); Cairns, supra note 116.
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3. The Lawyer
"I wish it were that way," Rodrigo said with a sigh. "But a lawyer's
training and culture disincline him or her to challenge the narrative structures we just mentioned. Lawyers who spoke up, or mimicked the emotional tone of the judge, would be sanctioned or disbarred." 9 Lawyers
cannot depart much from the stylized, desiccated stories spelled out in the
rules of pleading. Gabel and Harris proposed different standards for lawyers representing political clients, 20 but they were virtually the only ones
who did. Recent clinical literature contains articles showing that even
famous radical lawyers miss opportunities to tell their clients' stories.
Instead, they settle for the dry, cautious tone set out in the pleading books
and encouraged by the prevailing ethos, the bland decorousness of the
courtroom."'

12

"Even public interest lawyers litigating civil rights cases are prone to
place the client's story second to their own," I added. "I'm reminded of the
article you mentioned, in which Derrick Bell points out how civil rights
attorneys end up litigating one thing when their clients really want
another."" 2
"It's not necessarily that the lawyer has a superficial understanding of
the poor, black client. Rather, it's that he believes he knows best. He
believes he has to collaborate with the court by retelling the client's story so
that it comes out in the sanitized, approved version. And since most lawyers are white, male, and middle-class, this can be a real problem. If the
lawyer's experience, background, and history are radically different from
those of the client, the lawyer can easily dismiss the client's real objective
and substitute his own. Lawyers may know the client's misery and understand fully the story he or she wants and needs to tell. But too often the
lawyer puts the law story, the familiar one, the one he was trained to tell,
first. The lawyer is trained to operate within the system." 2 3
119. See Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: CriticalLegal Theory
and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHAGE 369, 399-405 (1982-83) (arguing that
lawyers must challenge the sanctity and political hierarchy of the courtroom to effect change in a

broader social context).
120. Id. The authors also propose an expanded concept of what constitutes a "political case." Id.
at 395-99.
121. See Eastman, supra note 89, at 765-72, 777-81.
122. Bell, supra note 34, at 470-72, 482-93; see also Anthony V. Alfieri, Practicing Community,
107 HARv. L. REv. 1747, 1751 (1994) (book review); Book Note, White Knight, 108 HARv. L. REv.
959, 962-64 (1995) (reviewing JACK GREENBERG, CRusADERs IN THE CouRTs: How A DEDICATED
BAND OF LAWYERS FoUGrr FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1994)) (arguing that, in certain

contexts, minorities can more effectively represent the interests of civil rights organizations than can
whites). "When the time arrives that a non-minority can just as effectively represent the interests of
minorities as the leader of a civil rights organization, the time will have arrived when civil rights

organizations are no longer needed." Id. at 964.
123.

See Eastman, supra note 89, at 765-72; see also Martha Minow, PartialJustice: Law and

Minorities, in TE FATE OF LAW 15, 68-77 (Austin Sarat & Thomas Kearns eds., 1991) (discussing
effacement of minorities through the choice of story); infra notes 135-43 and accompanying text.
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I remembered something I had just read. "Rodrigo, you have some
empirical evidence on your side. I was reading Paul Finkelman's review of
1 24
a book by J. Clay Smith on the history of black lawyers in America.
Finkelman commented on how few lawyers, black or white, were in the
forefront of the civil rights movement. 2 5 All the great leaders were
nonlawyers: Martin Luther King, W.E.B. Du Bois, Frederick Douglass,
Malcolm X, Jesse Jackson.126 They were historians, or teachers, or ministers; very few were lawyers. Do you think that's because a people in
trouble know instinctively a lawyer is not the one to tell its story as they
need to have it heard? Or is it that lawyers shy away from leadership roles
in social movements, preferring to remain in the background and conduct
negotiations, file for injunctions, and do the nitty-gritty work that allows the
real leaders to operate effectively and stay out of jail?"
"It may be both," Rodrigo replied. "Some lawyers do propose useful
things. Thurgood Marshall and the other lawyers in the NAACP Legal
27
Defense Fund certainly did, which Finkelman of course acknowledges.1
But the further removed a lawyer is by experience and background from the
group represented, the less effective he or she seems to be. No white male
middle-class lawyer advocated attention to racial slurs and hate speech until
a minority lawyer did.1 28 Catharine MacKinnon, not a middle-class white
male, proposed the elimination of sexual-history testimony in rape cases
and developed a new cause of action for sexual harassment in the workplace.' 29 No white male-except that genius, Alan Freeman-proposed
the idea that civil rights law, that jewel in the crown of our jurisprudence,
systematically disadvantages its very beneficiaries: minorities. 30 The
Supreme Court sees no serious problem with capital punishment that falls
disproportionately on minorities.' 3' And so on."
"I'm sure you know you are ignoring a few notable exceptions, like
Jack Greenberg," I said. "But as a generalization, you may be right. Why
do you think that is?" I asked.
"I think there is something fundamentally wrong with the legal narrative:, one simply cannot tell stories of many kinds of injustice through the
124. Paul Finkelman, Not Only the Judges' Robes Were Black: African-American Lawyers as
Social Engineers, 47 STAN. L. REv. 161 (1994) (reviewing J.CLAY SMrrH, JR., EMANCIPATION: THE
MAKING OF ThE BrAOc LAERm, 1844-1944 (1993)).
125. Id at 189.
126. Id. at 189-92.
127. Id at 168-69.
128. See Delgado, supra note I11 (arguing for recognition of a new tort for racist speech).
129. See MAcKNON, supra note 106.
130. See Alan D. Freeman,Legitimizing Racial DiscriminationThrough AntidiscriminationLaw: A
CriticalReview of Supreme Court Doctrine 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049 (1978).

131.

See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); see also Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v.

Kemp: Race, CapitalPunishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HA~v. L. RE,. 1388 (1988). Kennedy

emphasizes "the unfairness that race-of-the-victim discrimination visits upon the black community by
denying equal treatment with respect to those who kill its members." Id. at 1391.
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law. And if one's training is in the law, one has virtually de-trained oneself
to represent society's outcasts. It takes a superhuman effort to be an
empathic human being. To be both a lawyer and an empathic human is
practically impossible. Our review of civil rights history shows that the
legal narrative is less effective at promoting social change than that of practically any other profession, such as teaching, the ministry, or street-level
activism, for that matter. Most of your Crit friends think so, too."' 32
"That they do. And, at the day-to-day level, the rules of courtroom
etiquette require that one speak within the legal paradigm and not use emotional discourse, that one adhere to rules of evidence that carve one's narrative into little pieces and destroy its momentum and integrity.' 3 3 Lawyers
are trained to observe these rules until they become second nature. We are
trained not to empathize but to be technocrats, concentrating on the small,
not the big, picture. We focus on motions and pleadings, not stories, much
less things like injustice, love, and compassion. The lawyer ends up telling
his story, not the client's."
"We do allow victim-impact statements,"' 3 4 Rodrigo mused. "That's
one kind of new story we do like."
"We find it easy to empathize with the victims of crime," I said, "particularly if they are middle-class people like us."
"Even better, victims are not required to testify through a lawyer.
They can speak for themselves. When we want someone to speak really
effectively-that is, to help society condemn the criminal even more
roundly-we let them speak uninterrupted. We could do the same for civil
rights plaintiffs, but don't."
"But, Rodrigo," I interjected, "there is a whole new literature on effective lawyering. 135 It is being written by clinical faculty, some at the best

132.

On the limitations of liberalism in effecting racial reform, see, e.g., Davis, supra note 74;

Delgado, Chronicle, supra note 1; Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 25.

133.

See White, supra note 94, at 43; supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text; see also Gabel &

Harris, supra note 119 (advocating challenge to and destruction of this paradigm to advance social
goals); cf. Ktn-', supra note 53 (arguing that science advances only through reinterpretation of the

dominant paradigm).
134. For a discussion of a recent case dealing with victim-impact statements, see David D.
Friedman, Should the Characteristicsof Victims and Criminals Count?: Payne v. Tennessee and Two
Views of Efficient Punishment, 34 B.C. L. REv. 731 (1993) (analyzing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S.

808 (1989)).
135. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Stances, 77 CommLL L. REv. 1233 (1992) (reviewing the "effective
lawyering" literature).
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137
Cunningham, 138
schools. Writers like Menkel-Meadow,13 6 L6pez,
Alfieri, 139 and others are writing about client narratives. They are writing

about the need to listen more carefully, to translate better, to get inside our
clients' heads.' 40 They are warning about the dangers Derrick Bell first
raised, of putting the law and the lawyer's objective first.' 4 1 Do you not
think things are changing for the better?"
"I would like to think so," Rodrigo answered. "But a lawyer cannot
easily escape the confines of his or her background, culture, and professional discipline. Herb Eastman shows that even top lawyers, like the late
142
William Kunstler, tell dull, lifeless, stereotyped stories, at least at times.
And Anthony Alfieri, one of the best of the young clinicians, confesses that
he often falls short in empowering his clients and letting their voices and

136. E.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's
Lawyering Process, 1 Bmucr.aY WoMEN's U. 39 (1985) (exploring the sameness-difference debate
and the addition of women's voices to the legal profession); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is Altruism
Possible in Lawyering? 8 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 385 (1992) (noting the suppression of altruism and care
for others in the legal system). Menkel-Meadow concludes, however, that altruistic behavior can be
promoted in legal education:
I believe that with a focus on empathy training through perspective-taking, role-playing,
simulation, and other forms of less conventional legal education, we can actually increase
lawyers' awareness that they live in the world with other people who often have needs as
legitimate or even more legitimate than those of lawyers or their clients.
Id. at 417 (footnote omitted). On the potential difficulties of such a process, see supra notes 32-47, 6672, and accompanying text (discussing false empathy).
137. E.g., L6PEz, supra note 43; Gerald P. l,pez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven
Weeks in the Life of a Rebellious Collaboration, 77 GEo. L.J. 1603 (1989); Gerald P. Lpez, Training
FutureLawyers to Work with the Politicallyand Socially Subordinated:Anti-GenericLegal Education,
91 W. VA. L. REv. 305 (1989).
138. E.g., Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking about Law as Language, 87
MicH. L. REv. 2459 (1989) (recounting the author's experience as a lawyer and telling of the difficulty
in faithfully translating a client's story); Cunningham, supra note 51.
139. E.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client
Narrative 100 YALE LJ. 2107 (1991) [hereinafter Alfieri, Reconstructive] (arguing that poverty
lawyers must create a new interpretive narrative to integrate client narratives into legal storytelling);
Alfieri, supra note 122; Anthony V. Alfieri, The Ethics of Violence: Necessity, Excess, and Opposition,
94 CoLum. L. REa. 1721, 1750 (1994) (book review essay) (noting that "violence is frequently
submerged in the daily motions of law, legal institutions, and lawyers"); White Knight, supra note 122.
140. E.g., Alfieri, Reconstructive, supra note 139; Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives:
Recognizing Client Narrative in Case Theory, 93 MicH. L. REv. 485 (1994); White, supra note 94.
141. See Bell, supra note 34. On suggestions that lawyers afford clients a larger role in selecting a
case theory, see Miller, supra note 140, or in telling their own stories in court or in the law reviews, see,
e.g., Cunningham, supra note 51, at 1326-28, 1357, 1383-84. But see White, supra note 94, at 32-33
(describing how the author, providing legal representation for a poor black client, felt the need to
position herself with the client to overcome "a complex pattern of social, economic, and cultural forces
[that] underwrote the procedural formalities, repressing and devaluing [the client's] voice").
142. Eastman, supra note 89, at 778-81.
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personalities shine through.143 He goes on at great length about how he
erased the pain and identity of one of his clients, a certain Mrs. Field.""
"I read that article," I replied. "And even though his mea culpa is
drawn out over several pages, I kept wondering: did he ever really understand Mrs. Field? He recounts how his client, a Social Security applicant
who sought relief because she lost her job due to an inability to read, finally
broke down and wept.' 45 The woman was undoubtedly frustrated-the
judge refused to believe she could not read enough to hold a job-and
Alfieri was forced to demonstrate graphically to the court that she could not
read, by holding up various signs and charts." a But Alfieri read more into
it than that; he believed the woman was frustrated at being unable to tell her
story of segregated classrooms and growing up in a house without many
books."' 47
"I see what you mean," Rodrigo said. "Alfieri, although a fine lawyer
and progressive scholar, was reacting to her life experience as though he
had lived through it; in his imagination he was a black-white. And for him,
an educated, sensitive person, growing up in an environment without books
and being relegated to underfunded schools would have been intolerable.
Mrs. Field, though, might have been quite happy with her all-black schools,
as Bell reminds us.' 8 And whether she experienced the lack of books in
her parents' house as a deprivation, even we have no way of knowing. She
did experience the cut-off of Social Security benefits as a harsh deprivation;
that we know. The author seems almost as concerned with where he fit in
as with his client's own expressed desires, namely, for Social Security
benefits."
49
"Progressive lawyers may go on and on about their consciences,
etc., because they want empathy not for their clients, but for themselves.
They lose all their cases. Their clients sometimes lie to them. The judges
are rude. Often their clients want X when the lawyers want Y-the grand
declaration of principle, for example that segregated schools are always
143. Alfieri, Reconstructive, supra note 139, at 2128-29; Alfieri, Ethics of Violence, supra note
139, at 1721-44, 1749 (arguing that we must learn, unlearn, and relearn better or different approaches to
our clients and advocacy); see Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 COLUM. L. Rv.

1301, 1305-06 (1995) (arguing that lawyers must struggle to surmount the settled expectations and
dominant narratives associated with their roles).
144. Alfieri, Ethics of Violence, supra note 139, at 1721-25, 1729, 1733-36, 1749-50; see also
Alfieri, Reconstructive, supra note 139, at 2130 (providing another mea culpa about a different client,

Mrs. Celeste).
145.

Alfieri, Ethics of Violence, supra note 139, at 1724.

146. Id.
147. Id. at 1731-33, 1743, 1748.
148. See Bell, supra note 34, at 470-72, 482-93.
149. For other self-flagellations and confessions of failure, see Cunningham, supranote 51, at 1299
("I was one of his oppressors. I was his lawyer."); id. at 1325-26, 1330; Miller, supra note 140, at 56972; White, supra note 94, at 45-50.
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bad-as we mentioned before.150 In the end, liberal empathy is often false,
misdirected, or solipsistic."
The waiter, who had materialized at our table side while we were talking, asked us if we cared for dessert. I looked at Rodrigo who shrugged
back, a little eagerly, I thought. What the heck, I thought, I'll go running
tomorrow.
"Could we see your dessert tray?" I asked the waiter. He disappeared,
taking our empty dinner plates with him. I picked up our conversation.
"But you mentioned that there is another way in which litigation prevents
people from telling their stories."
4. The Court System
"Oh, yes," Rodrigo replied. "Law disaggregates and atomizes, treating
as separate many grievances that have a group dimension.151 This leaves
the litigant lonely and without allies. It encourages him or her to think
about his own grievance, not those of the group."
"I can think of a few ways it does this," I chimed in. "Doctrines of
standing and real party in interest limit who can sue or be sued.1 52 While
joinder is possible to a degree, and class actions are possible in some situations .... ."

"Although we both know how the federal courts have been cutting
back on the class action vehicle in recent years,"' 53 Rodrigo interjected.
"They insist on satisfaction of the minimum amount in controversy for
every plaintiff, 5 ' for example, and require notice to all class members who
are identifiable through reasonable effort. 55 These make group redressout of which a group story may grow-difficult."
"True. But there are other features that render courts unattractive to
social reformers. Courts are bound by precedent, which may contain bad
stories. If the only narrative law recognizes is a bad one--one that requires
that you demean yourself or tell your story in a strange and contorted way,
150. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text; see also Miller, supra note 140, at 569-71
(describing how lawyer wanted a client of color to adopt a theory of racism in defending against a

shoplifting charge; client rejected this theory); White, supra note 94, at 46-52 (recounting how lawyer
had scripted a client's testimony and suggested that the client "play the victim if she wanted to win").
151. See, e.g., Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 91, at 550-51, 559, 562 (arguing that because of
law's narrow scope, change in a legal rule leaves unchanged interrelated social structures); Grillo, supra

note 85, at 1550 (arguing that mediation may disempower by atomizing, especially for individuals, such
as women, with a relational sense of self); see also Richard Delgado, Stark Karst, 93 MicH. L. REv.
1460 (1995) (book review).
152. See LAuziNcE H. TmBE,AMERicAN CoNsrOroNA LAw §§ 3-10,3-11,3-14 (2d ed. 1988).

153. See CHARius A. Wimrr, LAW oF FEDRa. Cours § 72, at 518-25 (5th ed. 1994).
154. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973). Several district courts and one circuit
court have held that the supplemental jurisdiction provision in the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-650 § 3 10(a), 104 Stat. 5113 (codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1367), overruled Zahn. See, e.g.,
Free v. Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524, 525, 527-29 (5th Cir. 1995); see also WIGHT, supra note 153, at
523.
155. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
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or jump through very high hoops even to be heard at all-you will not
choose to tell your story there very often. Judges' experiences and life perspectives are those of a certain class. There are very few African American,
lesbian, or disabled judges, or ones from a working-class background.
Since their experience is limited, judges may be ill-equipped to understand
your plea.15 6 Rules relating to ripeness, mootness, and standing mean that
the court can only consider the case before it, not the broad story of dashed
hopes and centuries-long mistreatment that afflicts an entire people and
forms the historical and cultural background of your complaint.1 1 7 And the
decree, even if favorable, will fix only your story, not that of others, especially after recent cutbacks in res judicata law and the class action vehicle.158 In short, courts are ill-equipped to hear and act on the stories many
in our society most urgently need to tell."
"Another way of putting it," Rodrigo said, summing up, "is what I'm
thinking of calling the reconstructive paradox.1 -9 It's an aspect of what
you said just now. It begins by observing that the greater the evil-say,
black or female subjugation-the more entrenched it will be. The more
entrenched any evil, the more massive the social effort that will be required
to dislodge it. An entrenched social evil will be invisible to many-maybe
most-in the culture, simply because it is embedded, entrenched, and ordinary-seeming. The massive social effort will inevitably collide with other
social values, settled expectations, the way things are, and so on. It will
entail dislocations, new priorities, and spending shifts. These latter efforts,
civil rights marches, for example, or revisions in college curricula, will be
highly visible, by contrast, and will spark resistance and opposition. One is
apt to be characterized as 'Big Brother,' a fascist, a reverse racist, and so
on. Resistance then will feel principled to the resister, because the other
side will appear to be sacrificing real liberty, real money for a nebulous and
dubious social goal, like helping blacks. 160
"Reconstruction and reform, then," I said gloomily, "will always seem
unprincipled, premature, wrong, and will spark resistance-until one hun156. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 91, at 550-51 (discussing the way judges' background
and mind-set limit the way they interpret and apply doctrine).
157. On the limits of judicial empathy, see Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Norms and
Narratives: Can Judges Avoid Serious Moral Error?, 69 TFx. L. REv. 1929 (1991) (advocating both
judicial exposure to counter-narrative and additions to the law and literature canon).

158.

See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (partially overruled by Civil Rights Act of 1991,

Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071); see also Susan S. Grover, The Silenced Majority: Martin v. Wilks
and the Legislative Response, 1992 U. ILL. L. Rav. 43.
159. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 91, at 558-59 (coining term).

160. Id. at 558-60; see also Kimberl6 W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 H~Av. L. REv. 1331 (1988)
(proposing that adoption of the legal voice both advances and impedes the cause of social
transformation, because it legitimates the existing regime while pemitting small, incremental
adjustments); Richard Delgado, Shadowboxing: An'Essay on Power, 77 ComNEts L. REv. 813 (1992)

(discussing the way the cultural template, or backdrop, against which legal acts take place dictates
particular results).
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dred years later when consciousness changes, at which time we will look
back and wonder how we possibly could have resisted that."
"Oh," Rodrigo exclaimed. "Here's the dessert tray!"
IV
IN WHICH RODRIGO OFFERS A SOLUTION TO THE FALSE-EMPATHY
DLEMMA, AND SUGGESTS Two ROLES FOR WHITE REFORMERS AND

FELLOW TRAVELERS

We picked out our desserts, which the waiter quickly brought,
Rodrigo's a creamy French-Vietnamese pastry of some sort, mine a tangy
lemon sorbet. After eating for a few minutes in tacitly agreed-to silence, I
looked up at Rodrigo.
"I hope that my real dessert will be that you tell me what your solution
is to the predicament in which we find ourselves. Reformers and minorities
get little if any genuine empathy in courts, or indeed anywhere, and can
count on no one but themselves to climb out of poverty and despair." I
remembered my own sense of desolation when I thought Rodrigo was gone
forever. "Life's road is hard going. Can't we find confederates? If we
can't look to our liberal friends, to whom can we turn?"
"Empathy would work in a just world, one in which everyone's experience and social histories were roughly the same, unmarked by radical
inequality. In such a world, we would have things to trade. There would be
reasons for needing to get to know others, for understanding what they feel
and need. But, as we mentioned earlier, we don't live in such a world."
"And since we don't," I said, "what should we do? We can't give up,
can't just sit around bemoaning our plight or plotting revolution. There
must be a strategy, a set of procedures for operating in an imperfect world."
"I do have a plan," Rodrigo said, drawing a deep breath. "It contains
three provisions. It's all based on the idea that false empathy is worse than
none at all, worse than indifference. It makes you over-confident, so that
you can easily harm the intended beneficiary. 16 1 You are apt to be paternalistic, thinking you know what the other really wants or needs. 162 You can
easily substitute your own goal for hers. You visualize what you would
want if you were she, when your experiences are radically different, and
your needs, too.' 63 You can end up thinking that race is no different from
class, that blacks are just whites who happen not to have any money right
now. You can think that middle-class blacks or ones with professional
degrees have it made, need no solicitude or protection when their situation
161. See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 30-33, 55-56, 142-48 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 30-34, 55-56, 150 and accompanying text.
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is in some respects worse than that of the black who lives in an all-black,
working-class neighborhood." 1"
"Your solution, Rodrigo, your solution," I urged.
"Oh-as I mentioned, I think the solution lies in three parts. The first
is essentially to give up on, to forswear, the very idea of empathy as any
sort of primary tool for our advancement. We must realize that persons of
radically different background and race cannot be made vicariously to identify with us to any significant extent. Their help, if any, is likely to be
misguided, paternalistic, mistaken, and unhelpful. This is especially so if
they are lawyers and other court officers. Legal empathy is even rarer and
less trustworthy than other kinds. Law carves up your story, serves it up to
an uncomprehending judge, atomizes your claim, and sparks real resistance
when it tries to do something-as it does every century or so."
"And then what?"
"The next step-after abandoning hope in liberal empathy and crossrace, cross-class identification-is to urge one of two strategies that I think
will work. Would you like to hear them?
"Yes, yes," I said impatiently.
A.

Rodrigo'sFirst Planfor Whites: The Race Traitor Idea

"The first role for white folks who would like to be helpful is what
Noel Ignatiev and John Garvey call the race traitor.1 65 Have you heard of
the idea?"
I strained to remember. "I think I have. Don't they have a magazine
by that title?"
"Yes," Rodrigo replied. "I brought you a copy. It's in that envelope
back in your office. But I see you know about it already. Just when I think
I have an idea or approach that will surprise you, it turns out you know
about it already. It's kind of discouraging talking with you, Professor."
"Stop the flattery. You're miles ahead of me in most respects. I just
have a little more experience than you. Tell me how you see the race traitor
idea applying to our empathy dilemma."
"White people who want to help can become traitors to the white race.
As Ignatiev and Garvey put it, 'Treason to whiteness is loyalty to humanity.'1 6 6 For example, if a white person is in a group of whites and one of
them tells a racist joke or story, the white can look up in surprise and say:
'Oh, you must have told that story in front of me because you assumed I am
164. See ELLIS CosE, Tim RAGE OF A PRVILEGED CLASS (1993). The middle- or upper-income
person of color is apt to have more contacts with whites and thus more opportunities to be the victim of

discrimination. Id.
165. See Treason,supra note 5; see also 3 RACE TR-ffoR (Spring 1994); 4 RACE TRArrOR (Winter
1995).
166.

See e.g., RAcE TPa4 rrop, supra note 165 (front covers).
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white. I'm not. I'm black. I may look white, but my ancestry is black.
And let me tell you why I found that story offensive."' 1 67
"In other words," I said, "they identify with blacks radically and completely, not by imagining how they would feel if they were black, but by
identifying themselves with blacks when other whites ask for their help in
reinforcing white supremacy."
"Yes," Rodrigo continued. "And that includes rejecting white privilege, so far as a white-looking person is capable of doing that. In dozens of
encounters in life, one takes on the role of being, acting, and speaking out
as though one were a black-that is, one of us."16' 8
"I'm not sure how that is possible," I said. "Could you give me an
example?"
"Ignatiev and Garvey themselves give many. Whiteness is a social
construct, basically a readiness to accept many privileges that come to you
if you look and act a certain way.169 If you refuse to be white you begin the
process of destabilizing this construction that society relies on to preserve
the current system of racial subordination. So, suppose a neatly dressed
white person, who happens to be a race traitor, is pulled over by a police
officer and then let go with a warning. The person ought to question the
officer, 'Would you have done this if I had been black?""..7 °
"So whites ought to reject racial privilege and challenge manifestations
of racism that they observe."
"Yes. And if enough people do this, the system will collapse, because
whites will never be sure which other whites are confederates-are loyal to
the white race in the sense of accepting unearned privilege and conspiring
tacitly to keep blacks down. 7 ' The race traitor not only opposes racism but
seeks to disrupt its normal functioning, and does so from within. Therein
lies the concept's power. The color line is not the work of a few racist
individuals but of a system of institutions and practices. Race traitors challenge each of these at every turn: tracking in public schools; location of
public housing on the other side of the tracks; so-called meritocratic criteria
167. See Treason, supra note 5, at 85 (explaining the goals and practices of the Race Traitor); see
also Edward H. Peeples, Richmond Journal: Thirty Years in Black and White, 3 RAcE TRArroR 34, 45
(Spring 1994) (describing author's act of "racial sedition" in denying he was white, when confronted by
a store clerk who insisted that he could not intend to buy the "colored newspaper").
168. Treason, supra note 5 at 84-85. Ignatiev explains that whites must be willing "to pay the
dues, if necessary, to forgo the social advantages of being white, in order to achieve genuineness of
expression." Id. at 85. white "crossover" behavior may entail some "ripping off" of black culture. "By

itself," lgnatiev concludes, "crossover represents a potential for race treason, not the actuality." Id.; see
also L6PEz, supra note 43, at 24, 30-38, 50-51, 55, 73 (suggesting various measures by which activist

lawyers can identify more fully with the client community); Alfieri, supra note 122, at 1762-63 (same).
169. See Treason, supra note 5, at 84 ("[S]o long as the white race exists, all movements against
what is called 'racism' will fail. Therefore, our aim is to abolish the white race."); see IAN HAMY
L6PEz, WHrrE BY LAw (1995) (discussing the social and legal construction of the white race).

170. See Treason, supra note 5, at 84-86.
171.

Id. at 86.
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that firms and institutions rely on unthinkingly, even though they exclude
172
blacks and women. They put their lives on the line."
"So the idea is to show total solidarity with us and our cause."
"Yes, even though this means risking one's job and friendships with
whites. If the police and courts could not be sure that every person who
looks white is loyal to the system, that system would fall. 1 73 For then, what
would be the point of extending privileges based on race? Whites would
reject loyalty to their own race, rejoin the human race, and the idea of the
white race would fall of its own weight."
"A radical proposal, Rodrigo," I said. "I'm not sure many of our white
friends would adopt it."
"It does entail a radical commitment," Rodrigo conceded. "But, as I
mentioned, if only a small proportion of whites did, it would seriously jeopardize the system of white-over-black hegemony that has reigned in this
country for over four hundred years. And the form of identification it
would generate would be real. As we were discussing earlier, empathy is
not particularly reliable. One learns only from his or her own experience,
not that of others. The race traitor role allows people to begin to acquire
that experience."
"Could a progressive lawyer, like Alfieri, be a race traitor? Is this a
solution to law's confining role?" I asked.
"I'd like to think so," Rodrigo replied. "But I'm skeptical, for all the
reasons we just mentioned. Law is structurally biased against empathy. Of
course nothing prevents a lawyer from being a race traitor outside his or her
work in a law office, nor from using law strategically, from time to time, to
advocate the race traitor objective."
"Very interesting, Rodrigo, and it just might work, even if not for lawyers. But I think you said you had a second plan."
B. Rodrigo's Second Planfor Whites: Subversion from Within
"My second plan sounds almost like the opposite of the first, but as
you'll see it's not."
"Please go on. But, by the way, do you need to call Giannina?"
Rodrigo looked at his watch. "Her workshop won't be letting out for
another forty-five minutes. Why don't we go on?" (I nodded approval.)
"My second plan would envision whites working with whites to lift the
yokes of oppression that burden both them and us. I wonder, Professor, if
172. Id. at 85 (describing "six ways to fight being white"); see also John Garvey, Family Matters,
4 RACE TRaTOR 23, 26-30 (Winter 1995) (describing opposition to school "gifted program" structured

to favor white children).
173. Treason, supra note 5, at 86 ("Our strategy seeks to bring together a determined minority,
willing to defy white rules so flagrantly they make it impossible to pretend that all those who look white

are loyal to the system of racial oppression."); see When Does the UnreasonableAct Make Sense?, 3
RAcE TRArroR 108 (Spring 1994) (editorial).
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you heard the closing speech by the famous white radical at the recent CLS
conference."' 174
"I did. It was spellbinding, delivered with great panache. He held the
entire room, even without a microphone."
"And I'm sure you recall what he said. He described his own upbringing as a member of the ruling class, as he put it-prep school, Harvard,
antiwar rebellions, SDS. He was a creature of the sixties, and when he
grew up turned to CLS for inspiration and support."
"He not only turned to CLS, he helped develop it," I interjected. "He
was a founding father, helping the new movement carve out such notions as
indeterminacy and the theory that law is essentially politics."
"And do you remember what he said, Professor, about his own engagement with racial identity groups?"
"I do. He said he had sided with Black Power and the Panthers,
although as a more or less distant cheerleader and fellow traveler. He said
quite candidly that he thought he had little role beyond that, and that as a
member of the white privileged class he could not do much more, that there
is a sort of built-in limitation. Consequently he turned to institutional politics, the politics of daily life, teaching elite law students how to survive in
the corporate world and subvert their own offices and institutions. That and
deconstructing legal doctrine.
"What's wrong with that?" I asked, my voice rising slightly. "I was
there when he said it, and thought at the time that he was being commendably honest. What else could someone like him have done in life?"
"I don't want to seem harsh," Rodrigo said quietly. "He's a famous
figure, one from whom all of us have learned much."
"But you feel there is more he could have done?"
"Yes. I keep thinking that someone with his charisma and prodigious
talent could have done more. All it would have taken would have been a
slight shift-a few degrees this way, rather than that."
"And that shift is . . . ," I cajoled.
"I think our famous friend should have devoted himself, at least in
part, to working with his own race, that is, with disaffected working-class
whites. He could have supplied them with the analyses and leadership that
they needed, and at a crucial time. Working-class, blue-collar whites, ethnic whites, and poor Southern whites today are arrayed against minorities.
They have turned against us with a vengeance. They are the 'angry white
men' who helped bring about the Republican revolution that is setting back
the cause of social and racial justice, challenging affirmative action, and
175
demanding the end of welfare to the poor and desperate."'
174.

See Schedule of Events for The Politics of Class and the Construction of Identity: A Crit

Network Conference 4 (Mar. 10-12, 1995, on file with author) [hereinafter Crit Network].

175. Without a radical critique, affirmative action simply infuriates working-class whites, who
correctly perceive that it shifts the cost of racial remedies onto them. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, A
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EMPATHY AND FALSE EMPATHY

"You are saying that if the famous white radical, and people like him,
had stopped flirting with radical chic social movements like the Panthers
back in the sixties and gone to preach to their own blue-collar brothers and
sisters, we would not be in the fix we are in today?"
"Yes. They might have listened to him. Lower-class whites are not
our natural enemies. Quite the contrary. But they think they are. Elite
whites neatly use them to deflect attention from their own crass materialism, manipulation, and profits-from the way they maintain unsafe workplaces for the workers; pay bare subsistence wages; phase out factories at
the drop of a hat, creating real destitution; and send jobs overseas if it suits
their interest, all at the expense of workers." 17' 6
"So you are saying fancy Crits in elite positions at the top schools
aided the Republican revolution and the terrible turn things have taken for
our people and for the poor?"
"I am," Rodrigo replied with conviction. "They took the easy way out.
Instead of taking their campaign to the factories and lower-class tenement
districts, they listened to the Panthers, shivered a little, and went and wrote
elegant law review articles about the structure of Western legal thought,
mostly for each other's benefit. They abandoned their own people. Empathy-the shallow, chic kind-is always more attractive than responsibility,
177
which is hard work."
"Is it too late?" I asked.
"It's never too late. Look at what Ralph Nader is doing. He's writing
178
for workers in dangerous factories, consumers who buy unsafe products.
He communicates effectively. He has a fancy law degree, yet he addresses
his message to those who unfortunately have been led to think we are the
cause of their economic pain. He's trying to redirect their attention upward,
to the corporate elite that is oppressing us all, much as Martin Luther King
was preparing to do toward the end of his life, just before he was assassinated.1 79 Robert Kennedy, too.1 8 ° Workers and middle class whites listen
CulturalPluralistCasefor Affirmative Action in Legal Academia, 1990 DuKE L.J. 705. For a proposal
that people of color and blue collar whites unite in a coalition to overthrow affirmative action in favor of
class solidarity, see Delgado, Tenth Chronicle, supra note 1.
176. Derrick Bell, Property Rights in Whiteness-Their Legal Legacy, Their Economic Costs, in
CRrTCAL RACE THEORY: THE CurrnNo EDGE 75 (Richard Delgado ed., 1995).
AND NOTImNGNESS (Hazel E.
177. On responsibility and evasion, see JEAN-PAuL SARTRE, BEI
Barnes trans., Methuen 1957) (1943); see also Alfieri, Reconstructive, supra note 139, (calling for
mobilization, radical identification, opposition, and reconstruction as alternatives to currently
understood law practice); L6PEz,supra note 43, at 329 (same).
178. E.g., RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED: THE DEsiGNFED-iN DANGERS OF THE AMERICAN
AuToMOBILE (1965).

179. On the Poor People's March and King's planned rapprochement with the poor community, see
DAVID J. GARRow, BEARING THE CROss: MARTIN LTrn-rR KING, JR., AmD THE SouTnrHu CHRISTIAN
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 575-624 (1986).
180. Toward the end of his life Robert Kennedy demonstrated solidarity with California farm
workers, met with leaders of minority and poor communities, and was present at the origin of the Poor
People's Campaign. ARTnR M. SCHL.sINER,JR., ROBERT KENNEDY Am His Tnv 790-91, 846-47,
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to Nader-some of them, at least. There's no reason he should be working
at this alone."
"Nader also spoke at the conference you mentioned. He scolded the
Crits for devoting their lives to figuring out how many angels can dance on
18 1
the head of a pin."'
"I missed that session," Rodrigo said. "But I heard it was great. I'm
hoping it's on tape. I'd like to see it sometime."
"I think they were taping it," I said. "Maybe your library can get it."
"I'll see when I get home," Rodrigo said. "But, speaking of home,
Professor, I think I'd better be moving along soon. Thanks for the company. As usual, you're a great sounding board."
"You've helped me as well. I'd often wondered why empathy for our
people, our causes, and for the poor seems to be sharply declining. You've
helped me figure out why, and what we might do about it."
"Speaking about doing things, Giannina's workshop ends tomorrow at
noon. We were thinking of taking in that new show of early Industrial-era
art at that uptown museum. Want to join us? We've got a few free hours
before we have to go to the airport."
"I'd love to," I said. "Maybe I'll pick up a postcard at the gift shop
and send it to my radical friend you were mentioning. We know each other.
Maybe I'll suggest the three of us get together sometime for a small summit
conference. What do you think?"
Rodrigo smiled, fished a few bills out of his wallet for his share of the
tab, and gave me a quick squeeze on the shoulder. "I'm game," he said. "I
kind of like the guy, too. Want to share a cab?"
"You bet. I don't want you self-deconstructing on me again. Ready?"

872-73, 908, 914 (1978). Kennedy was the scion of a wealthy and established family; his willingness to
side with oppressed groups and challenge members of his own class gives some indication of the
potential for a Race Traitor to shatter ingrained assumptions and work for novel alignments.
181. See Crit Network, supra note 174, at 4.

